



Teacher Pay: valuing teachers and supporting education in the 2020s

National Education Union
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Executive Summary

1. The National Education Union (NEU) stands up for the future of education. The NEU brings together the voices of more than 450,000 teachers, lecturers, support staff and leaders working in maintained and independent schools and colleges across the UK to form the largest education union in Europe.
2. This submission to the School Teachers' Review Body (STRB) sets out the NEU's view on the key issues facing the teaching profession and responds to the remit on teacher pay in England given to the STRB by the Secretary of State on 15 December 2020.
3. This year's remit reflects the Government's wish to impose a freeze on the pay of most public sector workers. The NEU regrets that decision, and the consequential attempt to seek to restrict the STRB's recommendations. The NEU asks the STRB to undertake its usual comprehensive and objective assessment of the landscape and set out its views in full, including we hope in the form of formal recommendations, and then leave the Government to enact, or not, its proposal.
4. The contribution of teachers and other education professionals to the nation's pandemic response must be properly recognised. The Government's wish to freeze teacher pay yet again must be rejected. The current situation requires the STRB to undertake a comprehensive, holistic and meaningful assessment of teacher pay which addresses pay levels and pay structure issues alike.
5. The impact of Government policy since 2010 – pay cuts, dismantling of the national pay structure and imposition of performance-related pay (PRP) – must be fully evaluated with effective responses identified.
6. The critical and deep-rooted recruitment and retention problems have not been solved. The STRB must consider and recommend more fundamental action to tackle those entrenched problems by significantly improving teacher pay and prospects.
7. The changes made to the pay structure in recent years have made it unfair and unfit for purpose. Its discriminatory outcomes are evidenced in the results of the latest NEU pay and progression survey. Pay "flexibility" has not worked and the national pay structure must be restored.
8. Alongside action on teacher pay issues, a review of teacher workload and working time issues is urgently needed.

Overview

STRB remit and role

9. While the remit letter does not seek a recommendation from the STRB on pay uplifts for the majority of teachers, it states that the STRB should have regard to teacher and school leader supply and demand issues, the wider labour market and pay structure issues.
10. A meaningful or credible analysis of these issues requires the whole range of relevant factors to be considered – and appropriate recommendations made. For example, no credible evaluation of recruitment and retention is possible without taking into account the impact of pay cuts on the ability of the profession to compete with other graduate professions. Our evidence sets out a comprehensive analysis of all of the factors relevant to teacher recruitment and retention: pay levels, pay structure and workload. We call on the STRB to be similarly comprehensive in its analysis and its recommendations alike.
11. In the remit letter, the Secretary of State notes that: *“School teachers and leaders have made a huge contribution to the nation’s efforts in responding to the unprecedented challenges arising from the Covid-19 pandemic.”* He praises their *“extraordinary dedication”*. He then goes on to say that their pay should be frozen.
12. Later in this evidence, we explore the fundamental flaws in the rationale used by the Secretary of State for proposing yet another significant cut to pay in real terms. We also assess the further written evidence provided by HM Treasury on this issue. In relation to the STRB’s role, the remit letter must not be allowed to impede the comprehensive analysis required of an independent review body.
13. Also later in this evidence, we respond to the proposals in the remit letter on pay for teachers earning the full-time equivalent (FTE) of basic earnings of less than £24,000.
14. The STRB holds a statutory responsibility for advising on pay and conditions for teachers in England. In the remit letter, the Secretary of State notes that the Government values the STRB’s independent expert advice. He states that his priority is improving teacher recruitment and retention. This top priority cannot be credibly assessed, or adequately supported, if the STRB is constrained in its analysis by the Government’s political choice of a pay freeze.

15. There is nothing in the Secretary of State's remit letter, or in established custom and practice, to prevent the STRB from setting out formal recommendations on what pay increases would be needed in 2021 to support teacher recruitment and retention.
16. The remit letter states that, in making its recommendations, the STRB should "*reflect the Government's policy on exercising restraint on public sector pay awards.*" That does not mean that the STRB has to refrain from setting out what it would have recommended in relation to the full range of pay issues, including the pay increase due in September 2021; and to present as recommendations the action needed on pay increases.
17. STRB members know that the purpose of the STRB is not to simply administer pre-determined Government pay policy, but to provide a truly independent evaluation of the full range of issues on teacher pay. The STRB will best retain its credibility with teachers and school leaders by stating its views on all of the relevant issues including the impact of pay cuts and the action needed to restore the ability of the profession to compete effectively with other graduate professions.
18. The remit letter states that: "*It will remain the case that schools will be responsible for determining increases in individual teachers' pay on the basis of a school-level assessment of performance. The pay points introduced this year for the main and upper pay range will also remain advisory ...*" We ask the STRB to ignore this and assess the growing evidence of the problems caused by PRP and the dismantling of the national pay structure. As with pay levels, an objective evaluation of pay structure issues is essential to any credible assessment of the current picture on teacher pay and conditions.
19. In recent years, the STRB has called for remits on key aspects of the teacher pay and conditions framework. This year, in the wake of the pandemic, the STRB should take the opportunity to address the full range of factors relevant to the teacher pay and conditions framework as part of a strategic and holistic review.
20. In the Executive Summary of its 30th Report, the STRB said this in the context of the pandemic: "*There is an opportunity to secure a significant improvement in the competitiveness of the teacher pay framework over the next two to three years. By doing so, we can ensure that the teaching profession is better placed to attract high-quality graduates and retain good teachers both now and when the labour market recovers.*"¹

¹ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/school-teachers-review-body-30th-report-2020>

21. Since then, we have seen the growing impact on teacher health and well-being of the pandemic. Far from solving recruitment and retention problems, the pandemic is likely to cause more problems. We urge the STRB to work with us to tackle the fundamental teacher pay and supply problems, in the spirit of the statement in its 30th Report quoted above.

The fundamentals on teacher pay and supply

22. So much has happened since we presented our evidence to the STRB for the 2020 round, but the fundamental issues on teacher pay and supply have not changed. The impact of a decade of attacks on teacher pay was not removed by the pandemic. The deep-rooted and long-established teacher supply problems have not gone away. The need for urgent action to repair the damage caused to teacher pay and supply remains and indeed has been made more urgent by the pandemic.
23. The central objective must still be to secure pay levels and prospects enabling the profession to recruit and retain the teachers we need. The pandemic has only served to underline the crucial role played by teachers and other education professionals. They are key workers and have contributed so much to the country's response to the pandemic, yet the Government plans to cut their pay.
24. There is no credible justification or evidence for the attacks on public sector pay. Investing in public sector workers including teachers is essential to our economic future.
25. Instead of attacking public sector workers, and compounding the damage already caused by a decade of real terms pay cuts, the Government should put forward alternative and justified responses to the economic problems such as taxing the huge increase in riches of the wealthiest during the pandemic.
26. Securing the investment and reforms needed to pay teachers fairly and to support the supply of teachers to the school system is vital for those working in education, but also for parents, young people and the nation's economic future.
27. Teachers and other education professionals will play as central a role in the recovery from the pandemic as they have in responding to its impact. The urgency of additional investment in education has been heightened by the pandemic – yet instead of providing the additional investment needed, the Government plans to penalise teachers and other public sector workers to pay for the pandemic. This is not only unfair but will also cause severe economic damage and intensify recruitment and retention problems.

28. The evidence presented below supports our case for urgent improvements in the value of teacher pay. These improvements must include urgent restoration of pay losses against inflation as well as improvements in the value of teacher pay relative to other graduate professions.
29. Without such improvements, the deep-rooted recruitment and retention problems will continue. We have urged action to restore pay losses for a number of years. The Government has not listened and the teacher supply problems have continued.
30. We set out below how the Government's pay freeze would inflict further damage on the ability of the profession to attract and keep the teachers we need. We show how the arguments put forward by the Government for the imposition of the pay freeze are misleading. The Government's position is unsupported by the evidence and is out of line with the views of teachers and school leaders. Our position, in contrast, is grounded in the evidence and the real lived experiences of our members.
31. Urgent improvements on teacher pay levels must be accompanied by urgent reform of the teacher pay structure. The dismantling of the national pay structure and the imposition of PRP have exacerbated the damage caused by cuts to real and comparative pay levels. The removal of coherent pay structure arrangements within which potential and serving teachers can plan their careers and identify development opportunities has made it harder for teaching to attract and retain the graduate professionals we need.
32. We urge the STRB to be similarly comprehensive in its analysis and recommendations. That is why the STRB should set out the pay increases it would have recommended for all teachers this year had the Government not imposed a pay freeze; and to present these pay increases as formal recommendations.

The economic context

33. The pandemic has created an unprecedented economic crisis. As with previous major shocks to the economy, public sector investment including in education has a key role to play in securing economic recovery. Education is a right, but it is also an investment in the nation's future.
34. The Government, however, is planning to repeat the mistakes made in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis by attacking public sector pay. There is no credible foundation for this policy. We set out in more detail elsewhere in this evidence how the Government's pay freeze is based on a misleading comparison of private and public sector pay.

35. We address here the key macroeconomic issues which set the context for the Government's policy. These are directly relevant to discussion of teacher pay and conditions, because there is no credible economic or societal foundation for the Government's public sector pay policy.
36. We note the evidence from HM Treasury circulated to consultees in January. Far from supporting the Government's attack on the public sector, the evidence from HM Treasury underlines why we need a completely different approach from the Government. We deal with the pay freeze issues below, but it is important to critically assess the macroeconomic arguments in the Treasury evidence.
37. The Treasury evidence sets out the economic and fiscal position, in particular the huge reduction in economic output due to the pandemic. It is precisely because of the severity of the economic crisis that we need additional investment from the Government in the public sector, including public sector pay.
38. At a time of economic crisis, the public sector plays a key role in supporting economic activity. With private sector activity subdued and private sector firms reluctant to invest, public sector spending is essential to support economic growth.
39. Public sector wages are spent in the private sector, so cuts to public sector pay damage both public and private sectors. We know this from previous experience. The UK economy performed particularly poorly in the decade following the 2008 financial crisis.² This was due to the austerity inflicted on the UK economy, including public sector pay cuts, which contributed to below-trend economic growth in the 2010s and left the UK debt by 2018 double its pre-crisis level relative to the size of the economy.
40. In the 2010s the UK economy set a number of unenviable records: record public spending cuts contributed to record low earnings and low productivity growth.³ On the basis of ideology not evidence, the Coalition and Conservative administrations presided over sustained attacks on pay including for public sector workers.
41. The opportunity to invest in the public sector including education, to secure quicker economic recovery and long-term economic prosperity based on developing the skills and potential of our young people, was missed. Instead we saw the development of a serious teacher supply crisis and real-terms cuts to school funding. We must not make the same mistake again.

² https://www.niesr.ac.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20UK%20Productivity%20Puzzle%20NIESR%20DP%20448_0.pdf

³ <https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/13302>

42. Austerity and cuts have already left deep scars on our economy and society. The pandemic exposed and amplified the deep inequalities in the UK.⁴
43. The response to the pandemic was hampered by the lack of investment in public infrastructure including schools and highlighted the vital contribution of public services including education. The NIESR has noted that the economic challenges facing the UK are likely to “*expose regional, sectoral and income disparities.*”⁵
44. Research from the OECD has shown that the more equal a society is, the more prosperous it is.⁶ The Nordic countries are among the most equal, and the most prosperous, in the world.⁷ More austerity will intensify existing inequalities. Increased public investment, especially in education, is needed so that we can address inequalities. The Government was elected on a promise of “levelling up” – it must now act on that promise.
45. The Treasury evidence highlights the productivity challenge. The vital contribution of education to improving productivity is widely accepted and has been noted by the World Economic Forum.⁸
46. The Treasury evidence notes the “*significant but necessary*” increase in Government borrowing and debt. “Significant but necessary” neatly describes the public sector investment required to enable the UK to recover from the pandemic. With the cost of debt at record lows and the ability of the Government to repay debt over a very long timeframe, we must use this time to invest in education and other key public services in order to secure economic prosperity.
47. The December 2020 OECD Economic Outlook highlighted Government investment in essential goods and services including education, and decisive action to tackle poverty and inequality, as key priorities for policymakers. The OECD noted that investing in skills and ensuring better education leads to higher economic growth and well-being.⁹

⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/dec/15/health-inequalities-covid-ucl-government-policymaking>

⁵ [UK November 2020 -final+.pdf \(niesr.ac.uk\)](https://www.niesr.ac.uk/uk-november-2020-final+.pdf)

⁶ https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/in-it-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-all_9789264235120-en

⁷ <https://theconversation.com/what-the-world-can-learn-about-equality-from-the-nordic-model-99797>

⁸ https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5b9b87f340f0b67896977bae/K4D_HDR_The_Contribution_of_Education_to_Economic_Growth_Final.pdf

⁹ <https://www.oecd.org/economic-outlook/>

48. Research from the New Economics Foundation¹⁰ has underlined the need for significantly increased investment in public services to “*meaningfully improve services and remove austerity across education, health and care*”. The Government is heading in the opposite direction, proposing to repeat the failed austerity of the past.
49. On all of the above counts, the attack planned by the Government on teacher pay is wrong. Inflicting further pay cuts on teachers on top of the real terms cuts already suffered since 2010 will ensure that recruitment and retention problems continue and intensify. This is not the way to secure the investment in education that we desperately need to protect the economy and society.

Time to change course

50. The pandemic has exposed a number of problems with our education system. The NEU’s Education Recovery Plan¹¹ sets out our proposals to secure safety in schools and colleges, build a better education system and give all children and young people the best start in life. To achieve these objectives, we need an urgent change of course on teacher pay.
51. The Government must join with other consultees in recognising that current policy is not grounded in the evidence, creates major problems for our education service and must be reversed.
52. Many academy employers have ditched PRP because they know that PRP is unjustified, unfair and demotivating. The majority of schools use the joint union national pay scales because they recognise the value of fair, transparent pay arrangements embedding the principle of equal pay for equal value. Schools, unions and local authorities recognise the damage caused by the real terms pay cuts. It is time for the Government to change course, engage with the evidence and work with the profession to repair the significant damage caused by Government policy on teacher pay.
53. The NEU campaigns for pay progression for all eligible staff, implementation of the national pay increase for all staff and to ensure that employers are using the national scales recommended by the NEU and other unions.¹²

¹⁰ <https://neweconomics.org/2019/08/time-for-demand>

¹¹ <https://neu.org.uk/coronavirus-neu-national-recovery-plan-education>

¹² <https://neu.org.uk/campaigns/pay-campaign>

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54. Our campaign is grounded in the experience of teachers on pay. Our pay and progression surveys have shown that too many teachers have had their pay progression blocked on the basis of factors outside their control; too many have not even received the inadequate pay increases recommended by the STRB in recent years; and too many have experienced the pay inequalities that characterise the current arrangements. These factors have a direct cost: too many teachers have left, or are thinking of leaving, the teaching profession.
 55. To improve teacher supply and build the education system we need, we must value and support teachers. To secure healthy recruitment and retention for the long term, we must stop and reverse the attacks on the value of teacher pay and the unfair restrictions on pay progression resulting from the imposition of PRP.
 56. We must also have in place a fair national pay structure incorporating appropriate levels of pay and providing opportunities for career development. The action required includes reintegrating the key elements required for an effective pay structure. That includes ending the damaging fragmentation resulting from academisation. It also includes appropriate arrangements for supply cover.
 57. We set out below the steps we believe are required to achieve these objectives. We call on the STRB to recommend, and the Government to implement, the following urgent steps on teacher pay.
 - a. Restoration of a national teacher pay structure, covering all maintained school and academy teachers in England, including mandatory pay scales established by making the recently-restored advisory points into mandatory ones.
 - b. Restoration of portability of pay entitlements, removal of the threshold, and reduction of the number of points on the structure.
 - c. Pay progression recognising the acquisition of experience, with annual progression and the removal of PRP.
 - d. Restoration of teacher pay to its 2010 levels in real terms, as measured by the Retail Prices Index (RPI), over a three year period.
 - e. An initial step towards that goal via a significant first-year increase of the order of 7 per cent.
 - f. Inclusion of supply teachers in the national pay structure on the same basis as other teachers.
 - g. A full equality impact assessment of the school teacher pay structure, with identification of the reforms needed to secure a fair pay structure with fair pay outcomes by equality strand.

58. Following the implementation of these urgent reforms, the Government must engage positively with the unions on securing recruitment, retention and reward for teachers in the medium and long term.
59. The terms of reference for these discussions should be to prioritise competitive pay for teachers, along with support such as reduced workload and class sizes. The discussions must be based on objective evidence relating to teacher pay, recruitment and retention, and not on ideology.
60. Evidence of the inadequacy of the current funding levels is all around us: class sizes are too big, workload is too high, teacher pay has declined against inflation and compared to other graduate professions, and we have serious teacher supply problems. Teacher pay has been cut in real terms and many schools use funding problems as a reason to deny pay progression.
61. The action required to secure an education system that can support teacher pay and supply is not possible within the current inadequate funding envelope. To insist on working within the current inadequate funding levels is to perpetuate these problems and to close off solutions.
62. We must instead identify what is needed to create and support a first class education service for all; then, set out the investment required.
63. The Government must engage with the evidence and commit to solving the problems by fully and additionally funding the investment required.
64. The imposition of the pay freeze is a political choice by the Government. This political choice, which for the reasons set out in this evidence is unjustified, must not be allowed to silence the STRB on key issues or constrain it in its recommendations.
65. The STRB's work must be based on objective assessment of the evidence. The Government's political choices are its responsibility and must not be allowed to constrain the STRB. This year, the STRB again has the chance to set out the action it believes is needed to tackle the fundamental teacher supply and pay problems.

Teacher Pay – freezes and cuts

The Government's proposed pay freeze

66. All key workers including teachers deserve a pay rise. This section will set out the lack of justification and evidence for the proposed pay freeze. It will also highlight the impact of the announcement on teacher morale, which will in turn have an impact on recruitment and retention.
67. In his remit letter to the STRB, the Secretary of State says that we cannot carry on with “*blanket, across the board rises*”. For teachers, of course, there is no such thing as a “blanket, across the board” pay rise thanks to the imposition of PRP and the dismantling of the national pay structure with guaranteed pay points. This is another example of the many fundamental flaws and inaccuracies in the Government's case.
68. The Secretary of State's comment in the remit letter that the pay freeze will apply to headline pay uplifts, with progression pay and allowances continuing as before, is no consolation to teachers. They deserve a cost-of-living increase in addition to the incremental pay progression they should get to recognise their development of experience and expertise.
69. The Government's latest egregious attack on pay has caused dismay amongst teachers and other education professionals. In responses to the latest NEU Pay and Progression Survey, nine out of ten teachers said they were opposed to the pay freeze with the vast majority strongly opposed. The anger caused by the pay freeze proposals adds to the discontent teachers already feel about their pay: the majority of respondents had considered leaving the profession because of pay issues and/or felt underpaid for their job weight, role and responsibilities.
70. At a time when the economy is expected to be recovering, with pay in the rest of the economy picking up, the pay freeze will worsen the already poor position of teaching relative to other graduate professions, creating further recruitment and retention problems to add to the existing ones.
71. The pay freeze would break the £30,000 starting salary promise made by the Government. In its 2020 evidence to the STRB, the Government highlighted the disadvantaged position of teacher starting pay compared with other graduate professions.

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72. The DfE said this: *“Significantly uplifting starting salaries to £30,000 by 2022 will position teacher pay amongst the most competitive in the graduate labour market and make a career in teaching significantly more attractive to future cohorts of graduates.”*¹³
73. The gap between teacher starting pay and starting pay for other graduate professions remains. In late 2020, Incomes Data Research (IDR) reported¹⁴ that the median graduate starting salary had changed little compared with 2019. Teacher starting pay outside of London and the Fringe Area would need to increase by some 7% to match the IDR median graduate starting pay of £27,475.
74. IDR reported a “subdued” graduate market and this of course reflects the economic impact of the pandemic. We need to remember that even at this relative low point for the graduate market as a whole, teacher starting pay compares poorly. As the economy recovers and graduate prospects improve, the existing gap will grow even wider unless urgent action to improve teacher pay is taken.
75. The school funding levels announced in the 2019 Spending Round have not been changed. Funding that was intended to be used in part for teacher pay increases is already in the system but will not be used for this purpose. Effectively the Government, which has not adequately funded the costs of the pandemic for schools, is making teachers pay for the impact of the pandemic instead of rewarding their huge contribution to the country’s pandemic response.
76. The Treasury’s Economic Evidence to the Pay Review Bodies states that the Government will continue to provide pay uplifts for workers in the NHS due to the impact of the pandemic. It does not explain why teachers, who have also made a huge contribution to the nation’s response to the pandemic, will have their pay frozen.
77. The Treasury evidence also argues that a pay freeze for public sector workers is fair. We do not accept this description of a policy that will penalise people who have made a huge contribution to the pandemic response and have already suffered significant attacks on their pay including real terms pay cuts across the past decade.

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https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/859208/STRB_Written_Evidence_2020.pdf

¹⁴ <https://www.incomesdataresearch.co.uk/resources/viewpoint/graduate-and-apprentice-market>


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78. The Treasury evidence states that many public sector workers received above-inflation pay increases for the third year in a row in 2020. The picture for teachers is not as clear-cut, since many have been denied the recommended national pay increase under the PRP arrangements. Even where teachers got the recommended increases, they were only marginally above RPI. These increases also, of course, came after year-on-year real terms pay cuts dating back to the Coalition Government.
79. The Treasury evidence argues that freezing pay will allow the Government to invest in public services in response to the pandemic. Investing in public services, however, must include investing in the public sector workforce including pay.
80. The Government's case on public sector pay, which is used by the Secretary of State in his remit letter to argue for a pay freeze for teachers, is based on a completely inaccurate and misleading comparison of pay in the public and private sectors. In the remit letter, the Secretary of State refers to the "*existing gap*" between public and private sector pay but does not examine or explain the real context of such comparisons.
81. In his Spending Review statement of 25 November 2020, the Chancellor used data from April to September 2020, noting that in this period private sector pay fell by 1% compared to the previous year whereas public sector pay rose by 4%.¹⁵
82. This was an unusual and selective methodology and timeframe to use. The reduction in private sector pay was a temporary effect that had been reversed by September 2020. By September 2020, average private sector earnings were growing on an annual basis. In the period September to November 2020, average growth in private sector weekly earnings was 3.3%.¹⁶
83. During the timeframe used by the Chancellor, public sector activity and output was sustained in response to the pandemic whereas many firms in the private sector were closed. Clearly, the pandemic has had a significant sectoral impact on the economy – but an impact that is temporary in nature. As we recover from the pandemic and private sector activity increases, we can expect any temporary change in pay relativities between the two sectors to continue to work its way out of the system. The NIESR has described how the public sector acted as a "*shock absorber to protect households and businesses*" during the pandemic.¹⁷ This is particularly true for teachers, who had to cope with the impact of the pandemic whilst continuing to provide education.

¹⁵ <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/spending-review-2020-speech>

¹⁶ [Average weekly earnings in Great Britain - Office for National Statistics \(ons.gov.uk\)](https://www.ons.gov.uk/employment-and-labour/earnings-and-payments/average-earnings)

¹⁷ [UK November 2020 -final+.pdf \(niesr.ac.uk\)](https://www.niesr.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/UK-November-2020-final+.pdf)

84. As noted by the Institute for Fiscal Studies¹⁸ public sector pay in the decade leading up to the pandemic had been cut in real terms. As explained elsewhere in this evidence, real-terms pay cuts against RPI for teachers have been particularly severe.
85. The IFS went on to say this: *“Relative to pay in the private sector, public sector pay had fallen to its lowest level in decades, likely exacerbating difficulties with recruitment and retention”* (IFS, *ibid*).
86. Any comparison of public and private sector pay must also, of course, take account of the different characteristics of public and private sector workers (e.g. experience, education, gender) if it is to be accurate and meaningful.
87. The IFS has also shown how, once the different characteristics of the public sector workforce are taken into account, there is no difference between public and private sector hourly pay.
88. The graph produced by the IFS below (*ibid*) shows the long-term picture on private and public sector pay. We draw the particular attention of the STRB to the line on the graph illustrating the average difference controlling for employee characteristics, but it is clear on both measures that there has been a sustained fall over the past decade in the value of public sector pay compared to the private sector.



¹⁸ [What to look out for in the 2020 Spending Review - Institute For Fiscal Studies - IFS](#)

89. TUC analysis¹⁹ underlines the damaging impact of the Government's plans to freeze public sector pay. The policy will cut £1.3 billion from key worker pay settlements in England. Not only is this *"no way to thank key workers"*, as noted by the TUC, but it will also level down pay for all workers. Attacks on public sector pay hit pay for other sectors too because of the huge impact on spending power. As the TUC argues, the Government must drop this damaging policy and commit to restoring the pay cuts already suffered by public sector workers. Our proposals on teacher pay seek to secure those same aims.
90. The damaging austerity of the 2010s, when attacks on public sector pay caused damage both to the economy and to teacher supply, must be avoided. The pay freezes and pay caps of the 2010s lasted until the latter part of the decade and caused major damage. Teachers have only just emerged from that long period of pay freezes and pay cuts.
91. The STRB must call out the Government on the pay freeze, which is not grounded in evidence but will cause further major damage to teacher recruitment and retention.

Pay for teachers earning less than £24,000

92. The remit letter invites the STRB's view on pay increases for teachers earning the FTE of basic earnings of less than £24,000. The remit letter goes on to propose increases for these teachers of £250 or the National Living Wage increase, whichever is higher.
93. Again, there is an unacceptable level of direction in the remit letter. The STRB should review pay for these teachers, as it should review pay for all teachers, objectively and in the context of previous real-terms pay cuts.
94. We are clear that a minimum uplift of £250 is required at the very least in the current challenging circumstances for teachers earning less than £24,000 – like other teachers, they have seen their pay cut significantly in real terms. A £250 increase for teachers earning less than £24,000 will be below RPI inflation in September 2021 according to the latest forecasts available at the time of writing.
95. The proposals in the remit letter mean that many unqualified teachers would not receive the increase. The unqualified teacher pay scales in the joint union pay advice²⁰ used by most schools show that half of the pay points for unqualified teachers outside of London would not be increased. In Inner London only one of the six pay points would be increased; and in Outer London only two of the points would be increased. This underlines the inadequacy of the proposal in the remit letter.


¹⁹ <https://www.tuc.org.uk/news/england-economy-faces-ps17bn-hit-key-worker-pay-cuts-year-tuc-analysis>



²⁰ <https://neu.org.uk/media/5976/view>

96. We note that the FTE basis proposed in the remit letter would mean that many part-time teachers earning less than £24,000 would not receive the pay increase. Many teachers have no choice but to work part-time. This reinforces the need to address pay issues for all teachers, not just those earning less than £24,000 on the FTE basis.
97. We do not approve of any unconsolidated payments, which do not increase pay over the long term, so any increase must be applied to the relevant pay points and prescribed as permanent in the School Teachers' Pay and Conditions Document (STPCD), with all the pay bands treated in the same way.
98. Given that this is a specific expectation from Government that the teachers affected will receive a pay increase, the STRB should recommend that the Government should statutorily require that all pay rates in payment are increased by the relevant amount. As we have previously said, this should form part of all STRB recommendations for pay increases.

Pay cuts in real terms

99. Teacher pay levels have been hit hard by the real terms cuts to pay since 2010. The graphs below illustrate the real-terms losses against RPI at M6, U3 and Leadership Group point 1. The graphs roll the position forward to September 2021, showing the impact of the proposed pay freeze using the latest expected RPI level in the fourth quarter of 2021. RPI remains in our view the appropriate measure given its widespread use in pay negotiations.





100. The graphs above make clear the devastating impact of the pay freeze, on top of years of below-inflation increases. Real terms pay losses range from some 15% at the top of the MPR to some 19% for classroom teachers on U3 and Leadership Group teachers at the minimum of the range.

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101. At each of these critical points in the pay structure, it is clear that the major gap that has opened up since 2010 between actual teacher pay and what it would have been if increased by RPI was only partially reduced in the latter part of the 2010s. It will grow significantly in 2021 unless the pay freeze is rejected.
102. The latest Treasury average of forecasts for the UK economy available at the time of writing²¹ underline the likely impact of the pay freeze on teachers. Economic growth in 2021 is forecast at 4.4%, significantly above the long-term growth trend for the UK as the economy recovers from the impact of the pandemic. The average of new RPI inflation forecasts for the fourth quarter of 2021 is 2.8%.
103. The Bank of England said in early February that GDP was expected to “*recover rapidly*” in 2021.²² Teachers and other education professionals played a major role in laying the foundations for this recovery, but the Government plans to deny them any share in it.

Pay cuts compared to other graduate professions

104. These pay cuts have contributed to the falling value of teacher pay against other graduate professions. This is now an established and longstanding pattern. The STRB has expressed concerns at this over a number of years.
105. The STRB noted again in its 30th Report of July 2020 that teacher pay continued to lag behind pay for comparable graduate professions, with a “*significant gap*” continuing to exist (STRB July 2020, page x). The STRB rightly noted the importance of competitive pay for teachers as they become more experienced, in addition to the need for competitive starting pay.
106. The Government must be honest about the gap between where teaching is positioned relative to the graduate labour market, and where it needs to be positioned if we are to support the competitiveness of teaching.

²¹ <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/forecasts-for-the-uk-economy-january-2021>

²² <https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/monetary-policy-summary-and-minutes/2021/february-2021.pdf>

107. Average earnings rebounded strongly in late 2020.²³ The same was true of pay settlements.²⁴ The latest Treasury average of forecasts (ibid) for average earnings is for an increase of 2.6% in 2021, as the economy recovers and inflation increases. In its February report (ibid), the Bank of England noted that average weekly earnings growth had been “*notably stronger*” than expected.
108. It is clear that the “significant gap” identified by the STRB between teaching and comparable graduate professions is likely to grow if another pay freeze is inflicted on the profession.

Increases in pension contributions

109. In addition to the real terms pay cuts since 2010, there have also been significant reductions in teachers’ take-home pay as a result of the increased employee pension contributions. These increased between April 2012 and April 2014 from a flat 6.4% to an average 9.6% in a banded system. Teachers earnings £44,961 and above pay even higher contributions of between 10.2% and 11.7%.
110. Take-home pay was further reduced in April 2016, due to the increase in National Insurance contributions following the removal of contracting-out for occupational pension schemes.
111. We continue to be concerned in particular at the impact on young teachers of the very high marginal tax rate they face due to the combination of income tax, national insurance, student loan repayments and pension contributions. The only element which can be avoided is the pension contribution and this has caused many young teachers to opt out of the pension scheme.
112. On average, public sector workers including teachers are worse off in the recently introduced CARE schemes.
113. These points need to be borne in mind in any discussions about “total reward.” As we noted last year, there is no consensus on how this should be measured with some commentators ignoring, for example, the impact of workload.

²³ <https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/timeseries/kac3/lms>

²⁴ <http://www.lrd.org.uk/index.php?pagid=29>

The need for an evidence-based approach

114. Government policy is based on a disingenuous and discredited comparison of private and public sector pay. Meanwhile, in the real world, teachers have seen their pay fall in value against inflation and against other graduate professionals. As teachers reflect on the contribution they have made to the country's response to the pandemic, they see a Government planning to freeze their pay once again even as pay increases in the wider economy.
115. Previous attacks on teacher pay have contributed significantly to the development of a major recruitment and retention crisis. The limited and temporary improvements in recruitment in the wake of the pandemic have not brought that crisis to an end. A freeze on teacher pay will come on top of the damage caused previously and will intensify the recruitment and retention problems.
116. For all of these reasons, we call on the STRB to join us in calling for a pay increase of at least 7 per cent to all teacher pay points and allowances in September 2021. We do not believe that there is anything to stop the STRB setting out what it would have recommended as a pay increase in September 2021, based on the evidence, had the Government not sought to restrict the STRB by imposing a pay freeze. Similarly, there is nothing to stop the STRB setting this out as a recommendation to which the Government must have regard.
117. Indeed, setting out what it would have recommended is an essential contribution from the STRB because it helps all concerned to be clear about the gap between current teacher pay levels and the pay levels required to recruit, retain and appropriately reward teachers.

Teacher Pay – structural problems and pay equality issues

Urgent reform needed

118. Teacher pay prospects have been hit hard by the unevidenced and unjustified imposition of PRP. Pay “flexibility” has been used to deny teachers progression, even in many cases where they have met their objectives. Teachers see the pay arrangements as fundamentally unfair.
119. The pay system is broken. Instead of supporting teacher supply, it is making recruitment and retention problems worse. Serving and potential teachers know that their career development will be impacted by factors completely out of their control. The national pay structure has been dismantled, as the Government has sought to individualise all pay decisions. Academisation and the rise of supply agencies have added to the fragmentation of the national pay structure. We need a pay structure which supports the key principle of equal pay for equal work. We highlight equalities issues in a separate section below.
120. The current arrangements do not support the efficient allocation of teacher supply to demand. Teachers find it harder to make sideways moves for career development, because they cannot be sure that they will not see their pay cut. Teacher mobility, so important in a national system of over 20,000 schools, has been inhibited.
121. A holistic response is required. This must include the academy programme. As the STRB has noted (STRB July 2020, paragraph 1.24), teachers move between academies and maintained schools – so the rules should be the same. Also as the STRB has noted (ibid), most academies follow the provisions of the STPCD even though they are not required to – so there is clear support for national pay arrangements even after all the attempts to impose looser arrangements on schools and academies.
122. In its July 2020 report, the STRB set out what it saw as fundamental objectives of the pay structure. These included: earnings competitive with the wider graduate labour market; clear progression routes for teachers; support for multiple career pathways; reward for high performance, teaching excellence and capability; and reward for additional management or leadership responsibilities. The STRB also said that it is essential for the pay system to promote equal opportunities and fairness of treatment. (STRB July 2020, paragraphs 4.4-4.8.) We believe that these objectives cannot be achieved under the current pay structure arrangements.
123. We set out below the key issues which must be included in the holistic review of the pay structure for which we call.

NEU Pay and Progression Survey

124. Our position on pay structure issues is supported by our members, as is underlined by the response to and results of the latest NEU pay and progression survey.
125. With over 26,000 members responding to our survey and in the continued absence of the detailed information from the DfE requested consistently by the STRB, our pay survey is the leading piece of evidence on teacher experiences of the pay structure. We set out below the key findings from the survey. A full report of the survey is appended to this evidence.

Teachers' feelings about their pay

- 91% are opposed to the proposed pay freeze, with the vast majority saying they are strongly opposed.
- 60% have considered quitting the profession because of low pay or concerns about unfairness in pay progression.
- 56% feel that they are underpaid for their job weight, role and responsibilities.

Annual pay increases and pay scales

- 60% of respondents told us they had received a cost-of-living increase in line with the national increase for September 2020.
- 1% of respondents said they had been told the school would not be paying any cost-of-living increase.
- 29% did not know whether they had received an increase and 8% said no decision had been taken.

Pay progression (among those eligible, 52% of the total response)

- 17% still did not know the outcome of their pay progression decision when completing the survey in December 2020.
- 8% of respondents who did know the outcome had been denied progression, a small increase after a longer downward trend.
- 13% of those teachers said that they had been explicitly told that the decision was due to funding or budgetary constraints rather than performance.

Pay progression - those turned down for progression:

- only 30% said that the impact of the pandemic on performance objectives had been taken into account in their appraisal review;
- 96% had been given no indication during the year that they were failing to meet the required standards; and
- 91% felt that the decision was unfair but the vast majority (84%) had chosen not to appeal the decision, often saying that they felt there was little point in doing so.

Restore the national pay structure

126. There is widespread support for the restoration of a mandatory national pay structure with mandatory pay points. This consensus is built on the widespread acceptance that the fairness and transparency of mandatory national pay arrangements are essential to support teachers and schools.
127. Schools' use of the joint union pay scales shows that they would welcome a return to the system whereby national recommendations on pay increases are reflected in guaranteed pay increases across the school system. This is also essential to the ability of the pay structure to support recruitment and retention, because serving and potential teachers could be sure that they would get the nationally-mandated pay levels and annual cost-of-living increases.
128. The foundation for effective reform already exists. Despite the dismantling of the national pay structure, many schools and academies continue to adhere to the joint union pay advice from the NEU, ASCL, NAHT and Voice.²⁵ They recognise the value of national pay points and we again recommend the joint union advice to the STRB.
129. A national pay structure with mandatory points is essential to underpin the key principle of equal pay for work of equal value. We discuss pay equalities in more detail elsewhere in this submission, but it is important to note that nationally mandatory pay points provide an essential safeguard against the inconsistent and unfair pay practice in the current system. National mandatory pay scales reduce the possibility of conscious or unconscious bias in pay decisions.

Restore pay portability

130. The pay structure needs to support teacher mobility in a huge school system. We need to enable and support sideways moves for career development, which means restoring pay portability.
131. Restoration of pay portability will also help to reduce the discriminatory impact on pay for women teachers when they take career breaks for family reasons. Teachers returning to the profession after a career break should get the same or equivalent point for years of service for which pay progression was awarded.

²⁵ <https://neu.org.uk/media/5976/view>

132. Pay portability arrangements must be restored on the basis of the pre-2013 STPCDs. This would recognise years of service as a teacher, in addition to the point reached in the most recent teaching post. The STPCD should again prescribe that points acquired through pay progression are retained as permanent entitlements. Pre-2013 statutory provisions on post-threshold teachers to recognise issues such as meeting the equivalent threshold standards in other settings should also be restored.
133. To repair the damage caused by so-called pay “flexibility,” following restoration of the national pay structure schools should assess cases where teachers were denied progression under the arrangements since 2013 but would previously have received it. Such teachers have suffered an unfair detriment causing lasting and significant damage to career earnings. They deserve recompense.
134. The national pay structure should use a single pay spine for classroom teachers, replacing the current separation of the Main and Upper Pay Ranges.
135. We know that pay progression rates tail off significantly at the current “threshold” between the MPR and UPR, and on the UPR itself. This is unacceptable and is contrary to the original purpose of the UPR, which was to ensure that experienced classroom teachers are properly rewarded without having to move into the leadership group. A single classroom teacher pay scale would remove this artificial hurdle and thereby improve the attractiveness of teaching as a career.
136. Teachers are often required to undertake significant additional responsibilities without appropriate payment, simply because they are on the UPR. This is directly contrary to the provisions of the STPCD, which states that teachers cannot be expected to undertake such responsibilities without “appropriate additional payment” (STPCD statutory guidance, Section 3, paragraph 48).²⁶
137. The contribution and development of teachers who have reached the UPR needs to be appropriately recognised, separately from any additional payment due for undertaking responsibilities for a subject area or managing other teachers.

Abolish PRP

138. As with the national pay structure issue, there is a strong consensus on the issue of PRP. There is overwhelming opposition to the link between appraisal and pay.

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https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/920904/2020_STPCD_FINAL_230920.pdf

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139. The continued existence of PRP is severely demotivating. We need a pay system that rewards teachers for their acquisition of experience and expertise, but we have instead PRP which is used to penalise teachers in pay terms for matters that are completely outside their control. A significant number of respondents to the NEU pay and progression survey – 13% this year – were explicitly told that the decision to deny them pay progression was taken on funding or budgetary grounds. This underlines the potential for PRP to be used in a way that is completely unfair and demotivating.
140. Teachers can find that they have met all of the objectives set but still have pay progression denied. They are often not only offered no support to address development needs but are not even told that the school thinks there are problems.
141. The NEU pay and progression survey found that almost all (96%) of teachers denied pay progression were not given any indication during the year that they were failing to meet the required standards. We again note in this context DfE guidance that there should be "no surprises" in progression outcomes; and that any concerns over performance should be raised and addressed during the appraisal cycle. Clearly, this guidance is not enough to protect teachers against these extremely unpleasant and demotivating surprises.
142. The NEU pay and progression survey also showed that even in the limited number of cases where teachers were given advance warning that they were not meeting required standards, sufficient support to address any issues was not provided. Almost half of respondents in this category received no support despite being told they were not meeting standards. Most of the remaining number either said support came too late or was of limited value. Satisfactory support provided to those warned they were not meeting standards was a very rare phenomenon.
143. PRP makes it much more difficult to achieve teacher recruitment and retention objectives. By reducing the transparency of the pay structure and enabling factors outside of teachers' control to affect pay progression, PRP prevents the profession being able to offer serving and potential teachers clear career pathways.
144. PRP contributes to an excessive accountability regime within which appraisal is often not a supportive process but is used to penalise teachers. Excessive observations add no value and contribute to workload problems but undermine teachers' professional autonomy and morale.

145. PRP has been dropped by a number of multi-academy trusts (MATs) including ATT, EACT, Elliot, Focus, The Education Alliance, Enquire, Consilium and NET. They recognise that PRP is and is seen as fundamentally unfair and works against the teamwork that is essential in schools. We must act to remove the damage PRP causes to professional relationships within the school, and to enable the supportive and developmental conversations that are opened up when the link between appraisal and pay is removed.
146. All of these serious and damaging developments underline the need for urgent reform of the teacher pay structure.

Fair pay for responsibilities and SEN involvement

147. Securing appropriate payment for responsibilities undertaken is essential to a pay structure that is fit for purpose. Payments for responsibilities should support career development and progression. They are also an essential support to the leadership supply line.
148. The current arrangements for Teaching and Learning Responsibility (TLR) payments do not support these key objectives. Instead, the current operation of the TLR system contributes to the unfairness of the current pay structure.
149. As with other elements of pay, real terms cuts and increased pay flexibility have had an adverse effect on TLR payments. Evidence submitted by the Government for the previous round showed falls in the real value of TLRs in payment. In academies, TLRs have been less common and TLR payments have been significantly lower than in maintained schools. The proportion of schools paying TLRs varies significantly across the country, when we should have equal pay for work of equal value including for similar responsibilities undertaken.
150. The proportion of teachers in receipt of a TLR declined according to the Government evidence submitted for the last round. We believe that this is linked to the increasing tendency to unjustifiably require teachers on the UPR to undertake additional responsibilities without payment.
151. Although the TLR problems apply in all sectors, there are particular problems in the nursery/primary sector where TLRs are much less likely to be paid. This adds to our concerns on gender pay issues, given that there is a significantly greater proportion of female teachers in the nursery/primary sector.
152. As with TLRs, the key aim is to ensure that additional SEN-related responsibilities are appropriately, consistently and separately rewarded by means of additional payment.

Fair pay for school leaders

153. School leaders have, like other teachers, suffered significant real terms pay cuts and had unjustified restrictions on pay progression imposed on them. The contribution of school leaders to the country's response to the pandemic has been immense.
154. The role of school leadership is extremely challenging in normal circumstances too. Government policy on pay has made the job of school leadership even harder. PRP causes conflict in schools and generates enormous bureaucracy, significantly increasing school leaders' workload. The excessive accountability arrangements have resulted in extreme high stakes which are inhibiting the supply route to leadership.
155. Action to repair that damage and to provide appropriate pay levels and career pathways for school leaders is essential if we are to tackle the deep-seated recruitment and retention problems for school leadership. Pay for school leaders must be fair and rooted in the circumstances of the school. Pay arrangements should reflect a whole-school approach, so that pay for school leaders is not detached from pay arrangements for other teachers in the school.
156. The flexible leadership pay arrangements in place have resulted in inappropriate benefits for some individuals, but for the vast majority of school leaders pay problems such as unjustified barriers to progression are much more common.
157. As we have said previously to the STRB, pay arrangements for Executive Heads and academy CEOs must be brought within the STPCD as part of the coherent, holistic and fair pay structure for which we call.
158. Pay arrangements for school leaders must meet these key tests: fairness, with decisions on pay taken in the context of the whole school; transparency, with a national pay structure and pay points providing equal pay for work of equivalent value; competitiveness, with pay levels and prospects enabling the profession to recruit and retain the leaders it needs; and value, with pay levels reflecting the critical and demanding role played by school leaders.

Pay progression and inequality

159. Despite the clear recommendations of the STRB in previous years, the DfE has still not produced the clear and comprehensive information on the operation of the pay system including pay progression for which we and others have called. We have reported previously and report again this year on the clear evidence that the pay system produces discriminatory outcomes, but the robust monitoring of the equalities implications of the pay system for which the STRB called again last year is still not in place.

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160. Unfortunately, we continue to see structural discrimination in the teacher pay structure, as illustrated by annual NEU research.
161. In the exercise of their functions, Government departments are required under Part 11 of the Equality Act 2010 to have due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation and any other unlawful conduct in the Equality Act 2010, to advance equality of opportunity and to foster good relations. The Government must take steps to remove or minimise disadvantages on grounds of sex, race and disability. It must assess the impact on equality of its policies and practices before decisions are made. The Government has a duty to assess the equality impact of its proposals on teacher pay structures.
162. Lessons have not been learned from the Government Equalities Office (GEO) report on Women's Progression in the Workplace²⁷ published in 2019. The report concludes that one of the main barriers to women's progression comes from *"organisational norms and processes that allow gender bias to creep into decision making."*
163. The report illustrates how processes for progression open up space for bias. *"In the absence of clear systems and transparent systems, decisions about pay and promotion are more likely to be made through processes that disadvantage women, including via networks and the process of social cloning, where those in positions of power champion those who are like themselves"* (ibid).
164. The School Workforce data continues to show that women are disadvantaged in terms of pay and career progression.
165. The GEO report says: *"In many workplaces persistent norms of overwork, expectations of constant availability and excess workloads conflict with unpaid caring responsibilities – the majority of which still fall on women"*. This sentence sums up our members' experience of the appraisal arrangements for teachers.
166. The introduction of PRP has exacerbated overwork, presenteeism, excess workload and has all but eliminated any semblance of work-life balance for teachers.
167. The GEO report focussed on gender bias. The findings can be applied equally to bias against Black teachers and disabled teachers. The Government cannot proceed with PRP, advisory pay awards and the new proposals without undertaking a comprehensive equality impact assessment.

²⁷ [Gender equality at work: research on the barriers to women's progression - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/research-data-and-analysis/2019/06/gender-equality-at-work-research-on-the-barriers-to-women-s-progression)

The pregnancy penalty

168. The latest NEU pay research found that of respondents who were eligible for pay progression and knew the outcome of their application, 7% of those who had not been absent on maternity leave were denied pay progression while 11% of women who had been on maternity leave were denied progression. Lack of transparency in school pay systems is permitting decision makers to discriminate unlawfully. We found evidence of explicit discrimination. Twenty women were told expressly by the decision maker that they would not progress because they had been absent due to pregnancy or maternity leave. One teacher said simply, "*We are not allowed pay progression when we are on maternity leave.*"

Disabled teachers

169. Of all respondents who were eligible for pay progression and knew the outcome of their application 92% were awarded progression but just 89% of disabled men and women and only 84% of disabled men were so rewarded.

Ethnicity pay gap

170. Compared to 93% of white respondents who were eligible for pay progression and knew the outcome of their application and were awarded pay progression, just 87% of Asian²⁸ women, 86% of Asian men, 89% of Black²⁹ women and only 81% of Black men were awarded pay progression.

Part time and flexible working

171. While 94% of full-time respondents who were eligible for pay progression, knew the outcome of their application and were awarded pay progression, only 85% of respondents working part time or other flexible arrangements were awarded pay progression. Responses indicated that the contributions of part time teachers to the school were not appreciated or recognised and that only those on a full time contract were considered to have made a wider contribution to the school. This is clearly detrimental to part time teachers, the majority of whom are women.

Supply Teacher Issues

172. As noted elsewhere, a holistic review of all relevant pay structure issues must include supply teacher issues. The current arrangements are expensive, unfair and inefficient.

²⁸ Asian includes Asian, Asian British, Asian Bangladeshi, Asian Chinese, Asian Indian, Asian Pakistani, Asian Other

²⁹ Black includes Black or Black British African, Black or Black British Caribbean, Black or Black British Other

173. The equality and fairness issues affecting supply teachers have of course been made worse during the pandemic, with the closure of schools to many students and the reluctance of schools to employ supply staff even when fully open.
174. The NEU's Charter for Supply Educators³⁰ sets out our aspirations for our supply teacher and support staff members. We note below the key points and recommend these to the STRB:
- a. ensure that supply teachers are paid in accordance with the national pay arrangements for teachers in regular employment and at a rate appropriate to their level of experience and the demands of the role.
 - b. enable supply staff to have equal access to the Teachers' Pension Scheme and Local Government Pension Scheme and other statutory and contractual entitlements as appropriate.
 - c. establish a new system for supply work in education which does not involve employment agencies or other commercial intermediaries and permits schools to employ suitably qualified teachers to cover teacher absences and vacancies while using support staff appropriately.

London pay and supply issues

175. The Secretary of State's remit letter includes "*Adjustments for London which is delivered via differentiated pay ranges*" as a consideration to which the STRB should have regard.
176. The STRB is aware of our concerns at the operation of the current London pay arrangements, including the impact on teacher supply in London.
177. We are clear that any move towards regional pay would be very damaging and that pay arrangements should be on the basis of the cost compensation approach. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that a separate review is needed of the teacher pay system and teacher supply in London. This should include cost compensation issues such as whether the currently-defined pay areas accurately reflect the additional costs of living and working in those areas. It should also include consideration of a London-wide allowance for teachers.
178. We would again welcome the STRB expressing its support for the Government taking action on non-pay issues that would support teacher supply, including improving the supply of and access to housing for teachers as key workers.

³⁰ [view \(neu.org.uk\)](http://neu.org.uk)

Teacher Supply Issues

Impact of the pandemic


179. The STRB's 30th Report was published in July 2020, at what was sadly an early stage in the impact of the Coronavirus. The STRB was only able to discuss initial assessments with consultees prior to the publication of the report and noted the considerable uncertainty created by the pandemic.
180. With the rollout of the vaccination programme, most commentators are currently forecasting a significant economic improvement in 2021. We present further details on economic issues elsewhere in this evidence and clearly significant uncertainty remains, but it is important to note that any impact on teacher supply of the extraordinary hit to the economy is likely to be strictly limited and temporary.
181. As the STRB noted in its July 2020 report (STRB, paragraph 5.17), the 2008 global financial crisis is a recent example of the impact on teaching of a major global economic downturn. The STRB noted that there was a 2-year increase in applicants to teacher training, but that the number of applicants was falling by 2011. Teacher wastage improved for only one year. The impact on graduate recruitment and pay was similarly short-lived.
182. The STRB noted that *"our consideration of the long-term trends confirms that there are severe and persistent problems with teacher supply"*.³¹ Although the particular circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic have led to increased numbers applying for teacher training places this year, this is not a long-term resolution to the deep-seated problems which have beset teacher supply for most of the last decade.
183. Far from solving recruitment and retention problems, the impact of the pandemic on teacher workload, health and stress is likely to create new problems.

Recruiting new teachers

184. Teacher recruitment problems are deep-seated, have existed over a long period and have not been solved by the temporary impact of the Coronavirus on recruitment for the 2020-21 round.
185. Prior to the impact of the pandemic, teacher recruitment targets had been missed for seven years in a row. Recruitment targets were missed between 2012-13 to 2019-20. It was no coincidence that this period was characterised by real terms cuts to teacher pay, the dismantling of the national pay structure and the imposition of PRP.

³¹ School Teachers' Review Body – 30th Report, 2020, Executive Summary (page x).

186. The stark recruitment problems were behind the Government’s commitment to increase teacher starting pay to £30,000 by 2022, but now this promise has been broken.
187. This long-term trend of missed recruitment targets has had a cumulative impact – existing teacher shortages are exacerbated by years of under-recruitment. Without enough new teachers coming into the profession to replace those leaving and to match pupil number increases, teacher numbers will not be sustained even at current inadequate levels. Key improvements needed, such as reducing workload and class size, will not be secured without significant additional numbers of teachers. This is the size of the task we face on recruitment and is the essential context within which we must see any temporary improvements.
188. The following chart shows the position in England over the past decade, where after reaching 50,177 entrants to the profession in 2014/15, recruitment fell sharply to 43,406 in 2019/20³².
189. It should be noted that this chart depicts all new entrants to the teaching profession and not just newly qualified teachers. It therefore includes returners to state funded schools, deferred newly qualified entrants and those who are new to the state-funded sector. The biggest single group is, however, newly qualified teachers.



³² DfE, *School Workforce in England, November 2019*

190. After seven years of missed postgraduate teacher trainee recruitment targets, the achievement of overall Teacher Supply Model (TSM) targets for both primary and secondary phases³³ does not mean that recruitment problems have been solved. Even in the 2020-21 round and in the extraordinary current circumstances, a number of secondary subjects missed their targets. Mathematics, chemistry, design & technology, modern foreign languages (MFL) and physics all failed to reach their TSM targets although these were significantly reduced in 2020-21.³⁴
191. There can be little doubt that the unprecedented economic crisis triggered by the pandemic exerted a significant influence on this year's rise in applications. Quite understandably, decisions to apply will have been motivated by a range of factors apart from an interest in teaching: redundancies; withdrawal of graduate job offers; and the economic uncertainty created by the impact of the pandemic.
192. Equally, there is little doubt that as the economy recovers and the graduate labour market returns to pre-pandemic normality the temporary uptick in applications to teaching will subside. Unless the fundamental causes of the long-term failure of teaching to recruit to target are addressed, any improvement in recruitment will be short-lived.
193. This was the case with the improvements to teacher recruitment that followed the financial crisis of 2007-08. John Howson, the teacher labour market expert, notes: *"After the start of the financial crisis it took just three years before teaching was starting to struggle to attract applicants to the profession. This time, with the pay freeze, who knows?"*³⁵
194. It is a telling comment on the Government's failure to secure teacher recruitment that only a major economic shock has interrupted the years of missed recruitment targets. We must take the action needed to secure a much stronger foundation for teacher recruitment.
195. Early indications for the 2021 cycle from UCAS show an increase compared with the previous year. The growth rate is significantly lower for potential new graduates aged 21 and under, underlining the point that this is likely to be a short-term increase from older graduates whose jobs have been affected by the pandemic.

³³ <https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/initial-teacher-training-census/2020-21>

³⁴ <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/tsm-and-initial-teacher-training-allocations-2020-to-2021>


³⁵ <https://johnhowson.wordpress.com/2020/11/26/no-tsunami-of-applications/>

196. UCAS statistics for the 2021 cycle show that applications as at December 2020 were up on the previous three years at around 42,000.³⁶ This compares with a figure of some 35,000 at the same stage last year. It should be noted, however, that at the same stage in 2016 there were over 50,000 applicants and this did not translate into a solution for the shortages.
197. Another factor hampering teacher recruitment is the size of the graduate-age population, which is forecast to shrink in the coming years as noted in the STRB report³⁷. With a projected decrease of 5 per cent in the number of 21-year olds between 2020 and 2024, teaching will be competing for a diminishing pool of potential recruits.
198. There continue to be a range of incentives to encourage entry to teaching. We and other unions continue to work with the DfE on its recruitment and retention strategy and Early Career Framework. As noted previously, however, these are not sufficient in and of themselves to address the recruitment and retention problems. Piecemeal initiatives cannot solve systemic problems.
199. We need to retain experienced teachers and leaders if new teachers are to be properly mentored and supported. Effective action to reduce workload for experienced teachers and leaders is needed so that they have the time to provide this support to new teachers. Recruitment issues, including support for new teachers, can only be fundamentally tackled with the effective and holistic action on pay we call for in this submission.
200. We continue to have concerns about the impact of Government immigration policy on teacher supply. In separate discussions with the DfE, we have welcomed some modifications to the Government's proposals on overseas-trained teachers, such as on settlement thresholds. Significant concerns remain, such as the exclusion of South Africa and Jamaica from the list of countries from which qualified teachers will continue to gain QTS without doing teacher training or assessment. South Africa and Jamaica qualify for the International Teacher Recruitment programme so should be on this list. Our concerns about portability of visas and the need for maintained schools as well as academies to pay lower fees have been expressed to DfE.

³⁶ <https://www.ucas.com/file/402056/download?token=LaEWBjPy>

³⁷ STRB Thirtieth Report, 2020 (3.41)

201. The STRB's 30th Report notes that there were 3,103 QTS awards from those fully qualified in the European Economic Area (EEA), including Switzerland, in the year ending March 2019. It goes on to point out that this represents a 12 per cent decrease from the previous year, with numbers having decreased each year since 2015/16 (ie prior to the EU referendum)³⁸. Our concerns are underlined by the declining number of QTS awards in England for overseas trained teachers set out in the graph below.³⁹




Retaining existing teachers

202. As we have noted in previous submissions to the STRB, the difficulties brought about by missed recruitment targets have been exacerbated by increasing problems of teacher retention.

203. The following chart focuses on the general retention picture. As will be noted, in the past few years the overall trend is one of rising numbers of teachers leaving the profession, even if the position appears to have begun to stabilise over the past couple of years.

³⁸ STRB 30th Report (3.47)

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
204. In its 30th Report, the STRB said that *“while the deterioration in retention rates is most marked for teachers early in their career, we are concerned that there are also indications of a growing challenge in retaining experienced classroom teachers and those in leadership roles,”*⁴⁰ a point we will return to later.

205. Wastage rates measure the proportion of teachers leaving, calculated as a percentage of the relevant teaching stock. Wastage rates *exclude* those leaving through retirement or death in service. In terms of age, wastage rates in England are highest for teachers aged under 25.

206. The information contained in the latest School Workforce Census confirms that the teacher retention problem continues to be severe. Although there was a slight tailing-off in the wastage rate in 2018 and 2019, the numbers leaving the profession for reasons other than retirement or death in 2019 still left the number of leavers at well over 33,000. This was more than 9,000 or some 37 per cent higher than in 2011. The chart below⁴¹ illustrates the increased tendency for teachers to leave the profession for reasons other than retirement.

⁴⁰ School Teachers’ Review Body – 30th Report, 2020, Executive Summary

⁴¹ Source: DfE School Workforce in England, November 2019



207. The School Workforce Census report shows that the problem of teachers leaving the profession in the early years of their careers has become worse in recent years.⁴² It shows a decline in retention rates for each of the first five years in the profession. Of those entering the profession in 2011, more than a fifth left within three years; for the 2016 cohort this had risen to more than a quarter over the same period. To lose more than one in four teachers within three years of beginning a professional career speaks volumes about the problems within teaching which must be addressed in order to secure a sustainable and sufficient long-term supply of future teachers.
208. The Education Policy Institute notes in its report *Teaching and Leadership: Supply and Quality*⁴³ (2020) that “In recent years, the share of exits due to reasons other than retirement has increased, with around 85 per cent of exits in 2018 as compared with 60 per cent in 2011. This is concerning as it means a much larger share of exits are now driven by teachers moving to other jobs rather than because they are retiring.”
209. The table below illustrates how each recent cohort gaining QTS had almost universally lower retention rates than the one before.⁴⁴

Year qualified	1 year	2 years	3 years	4 years	5 years	6 years	7 years	8 years
2011	88.2%	83.1%	78.1%	73.6%	70.1%	66.7%	64.7%	62.4%
2012	87.3%	81.6%	75.9%	71.9%	68.5%	66.4%	64.2%	
2013	87.0%	80.0%	75.1%	71.1%	68.0%	65.5%		
2014	86.3%	79.4%	74.0%	70.3%	67.4%			
2015	86.1%	78.6%	73.8%	69.9%				
2016	85.1%	77.8%	73.2%					
2017	85.1%	78.3%						
2018	85.4%							

⁴² DfE *School workforce in England: November 2019*, Table 8

⁴³ EPI, *Teaching and Leadership: Supply and Quality - 2020*

⁴⁴ DfE, *School workforce in England: November 2019*, Table 8.

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210. The School Workforce Census shows⁴⁵ that 11.6 per cent of teachers aged under 25 in all state-funded schools left the profession in 2018-19. This dropped to 9.7 per cent for the 25-29 age group and 7.2 per cent for the 30-39 age bracket. For those aged 40-49, the leaving rate was 6.9 per cent, but for those aged between 50 and 59 the rate rose sharply to 12.9 per cent, demonstrating that retention is a real concern for older teachers and not just those in the early stages of their careers.
211. In particular, we are aware of older women being put under unacceptable pressures to leave, both male and female teachers are increasingly choosing to leave the profession without necessarily even waiting to receive actuarially reduced pensions. Neither of these scenarios is evidence of a happy, healthy profession.
212. Research by RAND Europe published by the OME on 9 February⁴⁶ highlighted the teacher supply problems and noted that previous research had underlined the importance of pay in influencing teacher retention. The RAND Europe research attempts to measure the impact of pay on retention alongside other factors, such as working conditions.
213. We accept that pay is not the only factor influencing teacher retention, but it is an extremely important factor and any sustainable solution to the increased retention problems of recent years must include improvements in pay. The RAND Europe research supports our position, noting as it does that: “Pay and rewards are important retention factors, but they are not the only factors that shape teachers’ choices” (ibid, page vii).
214. The RAND Europe research goes on to say that: “Respondents were significantly averse to losses in pay and rewards (pension and pay progression)” (ibid). This supports the emphasis we place on the problems caused by the use of unfair PRP to restrict pay progression.
215. We agree with the authors’ conclusion that “no single intervention will effectively resolve teacher workforce shortages” (ibid, page ix). We have consistently highlighted the need to address workload issues as well as pay issues; we again include a separate section on workload in this evidence.
216. Rather than seeking to establish “trade-offs” between pay and other factors as discussed in the RAND Europe study, we believe that a solution to the retention problem requires the full range of teacher pay and conditions issues to be addressed.

⁴⁵ DfE *School Workforce in England – qualified leavers from teaching table*

⁴⁶ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/understanding-teacher-retention-a-discrete-choice-experiment>

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217. In 2018, the DfE commissioned CooperGibson to conduct some research into the factors affecting teacher retention⁴⁷. CooperGibson found the main contributors to be: high workload; few progression opportunities, a lack of autonomy; poor work-life balance; and issues relating to pay and pay progression. These problems affect more experienced teachers just as much as new entrants to the profession.
218. The latest NEU pay and progression survey appended to this evidence found that 60% of respondents have considered leaving the profession due to low pay and/or concerns about fairness in pay arrangements. It is clear from this that pay, as well as workload, contributes to teacher retention problems. This reinforces our case for holistic solutions, including action to restore the pay losses and improve the competitiveness of pay for teachers and school leaders.
219. We discuss workload issues including the impact of the Coronavirus elsewhere in this evidence, but we also wish to highlight flexible working issues in the context of teacher retention.
220. According to the NFER's annual report for 2020⁴⁸, 57 per cent of full-time teachers report that they would like to work fewer hours than they currently do (figures from 2018/19).
221. The DfE's recruitment and retention strategy rightly identifies flexible working as a means of retaining experienced teachers. We support encouraging schools to use flexible working arrangements more. Nevertheless, for many teachers the attraction of part time and other flexible working patterns is the reduction in workload compared with full-time working.
222. In 2019, 5.4 per cent of teachers decreased their working hours, either by moving from full to part time working or by remaining part time but decreasing their weekly hours. Such changes in working pattern produced a decrease equivalent to approximately 3,200 FTE qualified teachers between 2018 and 2019⁴⁹. This adds to the recruitment and retention problems.
223. Vacancy information needs to be treated with caution. It is collected in November, by which point many schools will have taken action to mitigate the effect of unfilled posts. This may include directing non-specialist teachers to take classes, increasing class sizes and reducing non-teaching time.

⁴⁷ CooperGibson/DfE - *Factors affecting teacher retention: qualitative investigation*

⁴⁸ NFER, *Teacher Labour Market in England – Annual Report 2020*

⁴⁹ DfE, *School Workforce in England, November 2019*

224. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the number of vacancies in state-funded schools in November 2019 was higher than any other post-2010 year except 2018. While the number of temporarily filled posts was lower than the previous year, it was the same or higher than in any year between 2010 and 2013⁵⁰.
225. Subject mismatch continues to be an indicator of significant teacher supply problems. The School Workforce Census sets out the extent to which teachers teach the subjects in which they studied for their degree or other post-A level qualification. In almost half of the 32 subject areas for year groups 7-13, a fifth or more of teachers had no relevant post-A Level qualification, and in nearly one third of subject areas a quarter or more of teachers had no relevant post-A level qualification.⁵¹
226. Teacher shortages are evident across the curriculum. For example, a number of subjects showed significantly higher proportions of teachers with no relevant post A-Level qualification than in maths.

Pupil numbers and class sizes

227. Pupil numbers continue to grow, without teacher numbers keeping pace. The net result is higher class sizes. At a time of continuing growth in pupil numbers, FTE teacher numbers increased only fractionally in 2019-20, by around 0.1%.
228. This adds to teacher workload and underlines the urgency of addressing the recruitment and retention problems. The proportion of teachers in the whole school workforce in 2019 was 47.9 per cent, compared with 50.1 per cent in 2011. The proportion of teachers holding QTS fell from 95.3 per cent to 95 per cent.⁵²
229. Pupil numbers are set to continue rising overall until 2022, sustaining the high numbers of recent years. Secondary school and special school pupil numbers are expected to continue to rise until the middle of the 2020s, adding to the urgent need to recruit and retain more teachers.⁵³ After a short pause, increases in UK births are expected to resume at the end of the 2020s and to continue increasing throughout the 2030s and 2040s.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ DfE, *School Workforce in England, November 2019*

⁵¹ DfE, *School Workforce in England, November 2019*

⁵² DfE, *School Workforce in England, November 2019*

⁵³ DfE, *National Pupil Projections, July 2020*,

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230. The impact of the failure of teacher numbers to keep pace with the increases in pupil numbers can be seen in the Pupil-Teacher ratios and class size data from recent years.
231. The overall pupil-teacher ratio in the nursery/primary sector was 20.9 in 2019, the same figure as in the previous two years but higher than the figure for most of the 2010s. The secondary pupil-teacher ratio increased in 2019 for the fifth year in a row and was 16.6 compared with 14.9 at the start of the decade.⁵⁵
232. The latest information on class sizes shows the impact of this failure to ensure that teacher numbers increase in line with pupil numbers. Secondary class sizes increased in 2020 for the fifth year in a row. The average secondary class size increased significantly between 2018 and 2019, from 21.7 to 22 – their largest size for nearly twenty years. The average class size in all primary schools decreased slightly from 27.1 in 2019 to 27.0 in 2020, although this was driven by a small reduction in KS1 figures – KS2 class sizes have remained static at 27.9.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ [School workforce in England, Reporting Year 2019 – Explore education statistics – GOV.UK \(explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk\)](https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk)

⁵⁶ <https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/school-pupils-and-their-characteristics>

Teacher Workload

233. The NEU once again asks the STRB to seek a remit on workload.
234. Workload is a key reason for teachers leaving the profession. We believe that a remit to review teacher workload and specifically the STPCD working time provisions and such requirements in the STPCD that impact on workload such as teacher cover, administrative tasks and work/life balance is worth this review body's attention.
235. Teacher workload remains unsustainable despite attempts to tackle the issue. Numerous surveys and analysis by the DfE, NEU and other stakeholders show that teachers are still spending far too much time on planning, marking, writing assessments, and doing other administrative tasks.
236. The challenging workload situation facing schools has only increased during the Covid-19 pandemic. In addition to their normal high workload, during the pandemic teachers have also had to: develop and deliver remote education while continuing to deliver classroom-based teaching; regularly cover for absent colleagues isolating or sick due to the pandemic; ensure schools are Covid-19 safe; and constantly adapt to new teaching practices and other measures issued by the DfE due to the pandemic.
237. A recent NEU survey found that ensuring settings were Covid-19 safe was the main driver of increased workload in 2020. In secondary schools, this was closely followed by preparation and delivery of remote/blended learning; and in primary schools, pastoral care and wellbeing was a large driver of increased workload.
238. In response to the recent NEU survey, members told us:
- *'I am over worked and exhausted'*
 - *'Constantly moving between sites carrying resources is exhausting'*
 - *'In case exams are cancelled there has been an increase in data collection. This has led to a massive increase in workload of every teacher in my department'*
 - *'I feel abandoned by the Government'*
239. The extra demands of maintaining a Covid-secure school have inevitably added to staff workload. Teachers have had to keep schools open and COVID secure, as well as continue to provide high quality teaching which responds to students' learning and wellbeing needs.
240. Our members are exhausted. The NEU believes that unless more is done to alleviate teacher workload during the pandemic, there will be high levels of burnout in the profession.

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241. We believe that a remit to review teacher workload and notably the STPCD working time provisions and such requirements in the STPCD that impact on workload such as teacher cover, administrative tasks and work/life balance is overdue and requires immediate attention.
242. There is overwhelming data that workload continues to be a significant factor driving teachers out of the profession. Evidence gathered in recent years by the DfE, Unions, other stakeholders and the STRB have confirmed that significant increases in teacher workload and hours is having a huge impact on morale; and most worryingly it is having a negative consequence on recruitment and retention.
243. Workload is consistently given as one of the main reasons for leaving the profession. While some studies/surveys have used a general 'workload' category, several studies have a more detailed breakdown. In these studies, teachers have reported 'too much work out of school hours', 'accountability' and 'increased paperwork' as the main reasons for leaving. This is in line with findings from the Teacher Workload Survey 2016 and 2019 in England. Both surveys found that teachers generally felt they spent too much time on admin tasks, lesson planning, marking and data management rather than teaching. A breakdown by phase suggests that workload might be a more decisive reason for quitting for primary than for secondary school teachers.
244. Immediate action must be taken to address the excessive hours teachers are having to work. The 2018 recommendations of the Workload Advisory Group (WAG)⁵⁷, which have the Department's full support⁵⁸ are welcomed and so is the redesigned DfE workload toolkit plus associated initiatives. However, recent analysis by the NEU concluded that workload remains unmanageable.
245. The results of the DfE Teacher Workload Survey (TWS) 2019, Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS) 2018 and the teacher workload study 2019 by the UCL all show that workload remains high and is having a negative impact on the profession in terms of recruitment and retention.
246. Reducing the burden on teachers from data collection, marking, planning and preparation alone is not enough to fully tackle the problem. More needs to be done. The NEU believes a review of teachers' working time and reinstating guidance that limits time spent on cover and administrative tasks will radically help to reduce teacher workload to more manageable levels.

⁵⁷https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/754349/Workload_Advisory_Group-report.pdf

⁵⁸https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/753496/Workload_Advisory_Group_response_table_final.pdf

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247. The Department's teacher workload survey (TWS) 2019 confirmed that although there has been a small reduction in working hours between 2016 and 2019, which is not corroborated by NEU member experience, 94% of full-time teachers and middle leaders are still working more than 40 hours a week and 57% of full-time teachers and middle leaders are still working more than 50 hours a week. Furthermore, around two-thirds of full-time teachers are still working longer than the 48-hour maximum stipulated by the Working Time Regulations.
248. The proportion of teachers viewing workload as a fairly/very serious problem has reduced slightly but remains high. Some 73% of primary teachers and 87% of secondary teachers say workload is a serious problem. Although this is lower than reported in the TWS 2016, it is still clearly a significant problem that has worsened due to the pandemic and still needs to be tackled.
249. Perceptions of workload and its impact on work life are still extremely negative in the TWS 2019. 91% of primary and 94% of secondary teachers reported that they could not complete assigned workload during contracted working hours; 65% of primary and 79% of secondary teachers stated their workload was unacceptable; and only 31% of primary and 26% of secondary school teachers agreed that they achieved a good balance between work life and private life. Unbelievably, these results are actually a slight improvement from the TWS in 2016! However, it is not unreasonable to believe these numbers may now be back to 2016 levels because of Covid-19.
250. Another worrying factor adding to teacher workload identified in the 2019 TWS is the amount of time spent on performance management and pay determination. A large proportion of primary and secondary senior leaders responding to the survey raised the issue of time spent on performance management. The number of primary senior leaders spending time on performance management of staff increased by 33% between TWS 2016 and 2019 and by 12% for secondary senior leaders.
251. The NEU is not surprised that there is increasing groundswell of opinion against PRP. Its contribution to excessive workload adds to the reasons why it should be abolished.
252. The Teacher Labour Market in England Annual Report (June) 2020 by the NFER (National Foundation for Education Research) found that teachers work longer term-time hours than other professionals in a typical week.

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253. Teachers also work additional hours during periods when the school is closed; continue to have the lowest satisfaction with their amount of leisure time and are more likely to have low job satisfaction than other similar professions. Due to the nature of the school year, teachers' working pattern is very intense across fewer weeks in the year. Working long hours over prolonged periods, as teachers are doing, creates pressure and stress, with potential negative effects on health and well-being leading to unsatisfactory work/life balance. The key reason for this is high workload and teachers who cannot cope with the demands and constant pressures end up leaving the profession.
254. Teachers are working far in excess of 1265 hours. On average, approximately an extra 20 hours a week. Working time must be part of the discussion if we are to fully address the teacher workload crisis. We call on the STRB to eliminate or place a limit on the overarching requirement on teachers to *"work such additional hours as may be necessary to enable the effective discharge of the teacher's professional duties"* (School Teachers' Pay and Conditions Document paragraph 51.7).
255. The NEU has long been particularly concerned about this overarching requirement on teachers. If the requirement to work unlimited hours remains in place, attempts to address the current workload problems will be undermined. Revised provisions on working time should not include any such open-ended requirement. If excessive working time can be challenged rather than left open ended, employers will have to put in place practices that ensure teachers are not working excessive hours.
256. Achieving this cultural shift will be challenging for many schools, who after many years of doing things a given way have become entrenched in their attitude to workload. Recommendations to reduce the bureaucracy, frequency and unnecessary tasks associated with planning, marking and data management alone, will not reduce workload. They must be bolstered by tackling the unreasonable additional hours teachers work. This can only be done by reviewing the working time provisions and eliminating or limiting the additional hours a teacher may be asked to work.
257. Along with pay, workload, long hours and job satisfaction are of key importance to teachers. If the STRB is serious about reversing the downward trend in recruitment and retention, it cannot ignore the main causes behind teachers leaving the profession.
258. The NEU therefore again calls on the STRB to review teacher workload and the working time provisions. Limits on working time and other workload steps, coupled with better pay, will help achieve our aims of reducing workload to more manageable levels and improving teacher recruitment and retention.