Teacher Pay: Repair the Damage

National Education Union
Submission to the School Teachers’ Review Body
January 2020
INTRODUCTION

1. The National Education Union (NEU), formed on 1 September 2017, is the largest education union in Europe. The NEU supports and represents more than 450,000 members, including the majority of teachers. The NEU seeks to be a powerful and persuasive voice, championing the rights of education professionals and standing up for students’ education.

2. This submission sets out our views on the issues raised in the remit on teacher pay in England given to the School Teachers’ Review Body (STRB) by the Secretary of State on 18 September 2019.

3. We will set out a comprehensive analysis of the teacher pay structure and teacher pay levels in the context of the ongoing teacher recruitment and retention crisis and the unacceptable workload pressures that teachers continue to face. Our analysis is supported by a range of evidence, including independent research commissioned by the NEU from Incomes Data Research (IDR) which we present to the STRB separately. Our proposals address the need to repair the competitiveness of teacher pay, undermined as it has been by years of below-inflation pay increases and the dismantling of the national pay structure.

4. The Secretary of State’s remit letter referred to his wish to increase starting pay “to £30,000 nationally by September 2022”, but gave no indication of his views on the implications of this for the pay of other teachers. He also referred to his wish to see further changes to the teachers’ pay structure, but again without giving details. We assume that his written submission to the STRB will address those matters in more detail. We hope that his proposals are ones which we will be able to endorse. We are clear that achieving our own aims will require significant increases in pay for all teachers, as well as structural changes aimed at restoring coherence, fairness and predictability to teacher pay. We will comment on the Secretary of State’s submission in due course, but we will take the opportunity to set out our views on some key issues of pay structure in this submission, before responding to whatever the Secretary of State says on the matter.
TEACHER PAY: SUMMARY OF THE NEU’S PROPOSALS

5. We call on the STRB to recommend the following on teacher pay.

   a. The implementation of an immediate and fully funded increase in September 2020 of 7 per cent for all teachers, as part of a package of steps to restore the national teacher pay structure.
   b. The establishment, in consultation with the teacher unions, of a timetable for further above-inflation teacher pay increases beyond 2020, in order to restore in full the real terms pay cuts since 2010 and address the consequent decline in the competitiveness of teacher pay.
   c. The establishment of a long-term strategy on teacher pay, including monitoring of pay levels and pay progression against other graduate professions, so that the damage to teacher pay and supply since 2010 is never repeated.

6. Our proposals reflect our analysis of the current position on teacher supply, teacher pay and related issues but are in many respects similar to those we have made in previous years. The proposed initial pay increase, however, is different from that proposed in recent years. An initial increase of 7 per cent would match the increase paid to teachers in Scotland in April 2019 as part of the phased increase in teacher pay in that country. Teachers in England have noted that increase and have told us clearly that they see no reason why teachers in England should receive less than teachers in Scotland as an initial signal of a commitment to restore their pay.

7. Under the terms of the present pay structure, we cannot ensure that the pay increase for September 2020 reaches every teacher unless the School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Document (STPCD) requires a mandatory increase to every element of every salary in payment. We therefore ask the STRB to recommend this; and also, to recommend that the costs of the increase are fully and additionally funded by Government.

8. In order to ensure that pay restoration happens in fact, and not just in theory, a national and mandatory pay structure must also be restored. The current structure, operating at a time of cuts in school funding, has meant the denial of pay progression and often of the annual cost-of-living increase as well. We ask the STRB to recommend the restoration of a mandatory pay structure featuring fixed pay scales, portability of pay entitlements, and pay progression provisions which reflect the acquisition of teaching expertise through experience and bring an end to performance-related pay (PRP) in teaching.

9. We therefore call again on the STRB to review our analysis, adopt our proposals and work with us and our partner teacher unions to address the problems facing teachers, schools and the children they serve.
TEACHER PAY: THE CONTEXT

10. The future for teacher pay can only be properly assessed in the context of what has happened in recent years. In particular, we need to assess the impact of Government policy on teacher pay since 2010 in order to identify the right way forward.

11. As our previous evidence to the STRB has demonstrated, recent Government policies on teacher pay have caused huge damage to the ability of teaching to compete against other graduate professions. These policies include the following:

   a. the significant real-terms cuts in the value of teacher pay against inflation;
   b. the inability of teaching to offer pay levels and pay progression that are competitive with other graduate professions;
   c. the dismantling of the national teacher pay structure, including the removal of incremental progression recognising the acquisition of skills and expertise and the removal of pay portability;
   d. the imposition of PRP; and
   e. the real-terms cuts to school funding.

12. The policies have interacted negatively with one another. The serious recruitment and retention problems we see today are in great part the result of these policies. The real-terms cuts to teacher pay have resulted in it falling further behind pay for other graduate professions. The imposition of PRP, alongside funding cuts, has led to unjustified restrictions on pay progression as well as to increased workload for teachers and leaders. Teacher workload has also been negatively affected by funding cuts and teacher supply problems.

13. The STRB’s 29th Report made clear that the STRB shares our concerns on the key issues of teacher supply and teacher pay. Consequently, we again ask the STRB to acknowledge the legitimacy and importance of our conclusions.

14. On recruitment and retention issues, the STRB said that “the teacher supply position has continued to deteriorate” and that this “has affected teachers at all stages of their careers” (page ix). The STRB highlighted the key point that retention as well as recruitment is a major problem and noted that recruitment and retention trends “paint a worrying picture” (page ix).
15. On teacher pay issues, the STRB found that “teachers’ salaries continue to lag behind those available in other graduate professions” (page x) and went on to conclude that “this steady decline in the competitiveness of the teachers’ pay framework is a significant contributor to teacher supply difficulties. Until it is reversed, these difficulties will continue.”

16. This conclusion was correct, but unfortunately the pay uplift of 2.75 per cent recommended by the STRB did not secure the reversal of the decline in the competitiveness of teacher pay that the STRB had itself identified as imperative. This 2.75 per cent recommendation was significantly lower than the STRB’s recommendation of 3.5 per cent for 2018-19, which was not implemented in full. Teachers receiving the 2.75 per cent increase for 2019-20 (which not every teacher did) saw only a marginal restoration against RPI inflation and against pay settlements as at September 2019.

17. The STRB was also correct in its conclusion last year that it should not target its recommendations in the form of higher increases for particular groups. Given the disquiet caused by the Secretary of State’s eventual decision to implement differential increases in 2018, we believe that this should again be avoided in 2020.

18. The damage that has been done to teacher pay must be urgently repaired if we are to tackle its further consequence – the worsening recruitment and retention crisis. In 2019, we wished to see a teacher pay increase significantly above inflation and one which sent out a strong signal that the long-term decline in the competitiveness of teacher pay would be addressed as a matter of urgency. The absence of such action in 2019 makes effective action in 2020 still more urgent.

19. The Secretary of State’s remit letter refers to “the need to ensure that any proposals are affordable across the school system as a whole”. The STRB must not interpret this to mean that it cannot make the recommendations that are needed to address other critical areas of its remit – notably, teacher and school leader supply – because of Government policy on school funding.

20. The STRB should also consider the costs created for schools by recruitment and retention problems – for example, the costs of advertising and the fees paid to teacher supply agencies. We are aware that the Government has created a website intended to help schools save money on this area, but a website alone will be of limited help unless the root causes of recruitment and retention problems are tackled.

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1 DfE press release: New site to help schools save thousands on recruitment costs
21. The Secretary of State’s remit letter notes “additional investment of £14 billion in primary and secondary education between now and 2022-23”. Whilst any additional investment is of course welcome, it is essential that we put this figure in its appropriate context. Schools still face a funding crisis. The vast majority of schools - 83 per cent - will receive less money in real terms in 2020 than they received in 2015. We refer the STRB to the detailed research on this at www.schoolcuts.org.uk

22. The Government has been forced to accept the need for additional investment. The damage to public services caused by a decade of austerity was widely recognised during the recent General Election campaign. We hope that further steps to address that damage remain high on the political agenda.

23. The STRB must refuse to be constrained by the Government’s politically motivated and misleading definition of affordability. As we assess the state of the teaching profession and the impact of a decade of real-terms pay cuts, the STRB must make evidence-based recommendations for the improvements to teacher pay that are essential to tackling the teacher recruitment and retention crisis. It is for the Government to take the political responsibility on funding and implementing those recommendations.

24. We know that the STRB will be mindful of the relationship between funding cuts, teacher pay and teacher supply. In its 29th Report, the STRB noted that “any assessment of affordability needs to take into account the costs imposed on the system of not recruiting and retaining enough teachers” (para 4.29).

25. The real terms cuts to school funding have fed through into unjustified restrictions on teachers’ pay progression, denial of cost-of-living awards to many teachers and the allocation of responsibilities without appropriate payment. These matters and the even more critical problem of teacher workload have contributed to ever-growing recruitment and retention problems.

26. In addition to improvements to teacher pay levels, we also need urgent reform of the teacher pay structure. Such reform must not be limited to matters highlighted in the Secretary of State’s remit letter or submission. Key issues that must be addressed include the overarching problem of PRP, increasingly recognised as inappropriate by significant MAT employers, and other issues such as pay portability, the allocation of additional responsibilities without payment (to UPR teachers in particular) and the decline in the relative value of TLR payments.
TEACHER RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION

Recruitment and retention – the context

27. The STRB’s 29th Report was the latest in a series of reports noting the serious teacher recruitment and retention problems. Teacher recruitment targets have been missed year after year, as retention rates have also fallen. Retention problems have caused training targets to increase. Teacher numbers have not kept pace with the surge in pupil numbers.

28. The cumulative impact of these now firmly established trends is to increase still further the serious challenges the profession faces in recruiting and retaining the teachers we need. We need to improve the education service schools deliver by reducing class sizes and teacher workload, and making sure teaching provides the competitive and professional pay levels needed to support teacher supply. In order to do that, we need to tackle the root causes of the crisis in teacher recruitment and retention. Instead, those problems are being allowed to continue because the Government refuses to acknowledge that the solution to the problems must include significant additional investment in the profession.

29. We are concerned that the Government’s stance on teacher pay reflects an inherent bias against a teaching profession which is predominantly female. Real terms pay cuts and other attacks on teacher pay will reduce the ability of the profession to attract a diverse cohort. Teaching must be seen to be a viable career choice for women and men.

Teacher retention – a growing problem

30. As we have noted in previous evidence, the problems caused by missing recruitment targets have been compounded by growing teacher retention problems.

31. In its 29th Report, the STRB said that it had “significant concerns about declining retention rates, not just in the early career stages, but also among those with more experience” (para 4.33). We welcome this recognition of the extent of the retention problem, particularly given the DfE’s continuing desire to argue that retention is relatively stable when measured by reference to vacancy rates which are a wholly misleading measure.
32. The information contained in the latest School Workforce Census confirms that the teacher retention problem continues to be severe\(^2\). In 2018, a marginal annual decrease of 1% in teachers leaving the profession for reasons other than retirement or death still left the number of leavers at more than 35,000. This was more than 11,000 or 45 per cent higher than in 2011. Some 40 per cent of leavers were aged 34 or under in 2018, compared to 32 per cent in 2011. The chart below illustrates the increased tendency for teachers to leave the profession for reasons other than retirement.

![Reasons for leaving English state-funded system](chart.png)

33. This School Workforce Census report shows that the problem of teachers leaving the profession in the early years of their careers became even worse between 2017 and 2018\(^3\). It shows a decline in retention rates for each of the first five years in the profession. In 2011, a quarter of teachers left the profession within five years; in 2018, this had risen to almost a third. In 2011, 19.6 per cent of teachers left after three years; in 2018, the figure was 26.6 per cent. This growing failure to retain teachers in early career is well-known but the figures are still striking.

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\(^3\) DfE, *School workforce in England: November 2018*, Table 8.
34. The chart below illustrates how each recent cohort gaining QTS had lower retention rates throughout early career than the one before.\(^4\)

![Proportion of teachers still in English state-funded schools](chart_1.png)

35. The chart below goes further into teachers’ careers, illustrating the severity of the retention problem across the first 15 years of the career journey.\(^5\)

![Retention rates 2018 v 2011 by no. of yrs qualified](chart_2.png)

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36. Indeed, for all but one of twenty-one annual cohorts of teachers, retention rates fell in November 2018 compared to November 2017. For many of these cohorts, including all of those for teachers with between one and eight years of service, the retention rate recorded in November 2018 was the lowest in the whole series dating back to 1996.

37. Alongside the problem of wastage in early career, the latest figures on entrants and leavers aged under 45 underline the worrying trends on mid-career retention. The number of teachers under 45 leaving the profession has increased in recent years, whereas the number aged under 45 entering the profession has declined.⁶

38. As the STRB noted in its 29th Report, the loss of experienced teachers is an increasingly serious problem. The latest School Workforce Census showed⁷ that the average pay of teachers moving out of service (as opposed to retiring) was £36,101, underlining the point that we are losing teachers with significant experience and expertise. This represents a serious skills loss. Less experienced teachers lose the benefit of advice from those with teaching expertise developed over a considerable period. School leaders have less access to experienced colleagues able to support the school in developing the skills of young teachers.

39. The STRB noted in particular that, in the four years to 2016/17, there had “been a marked increase in the leaving rate for teachers aged over 50” (para 4.17). We are well aware from our members that older teachers are increasingly choosing to leave teaching without necessarily even waiting to draw actuarially reduced pensions, while older women teachers in particular are being put under unacceptable pressures and pushed to leave by younger managers. Neither of these are phenomena which we can afford to see continue.

40. We remind the STRB that research which it commissioned itself from the NFER also highlights the extent of the retention problem. Over one-quarter of teachers responding said that they were considering leaving teaching within the next 12 months.

41. Even more worrying figures emerged from the NEU’s own State of Education survey of NEU members conducted for our 2019 conference. 40 per cent of all respondents predicted they would no longer be working in education by 2024, while almost one fifth (18 per cent) said they expected to be gone within two years.

**Teacher retention – the role of flexible working**

42. The DfE’s recruitment and retention strategy quite rightly identifies flexible working as a means of retaining experienced teachers in the profession who might otherwise leave. We have worked with the DfE in order to help encourage schools to accept the case for flexible working. It should, however, be borne in mind that the appeal of part time and other flexible working for many is the absence of the workload associated with full-time working, which remains to be seriously addressed. The increasing numbers of teachers moving from full-time to part-time working, or remaining part-time but decreasing their working hours, led to a reduction equivalent to 3,000 FTE qualified teacher numbers between 2017 and 2018. Flexible working should be an opportunity for those who wish to work flexibly, not an escape route from full time teaching, if it is to form part of a solution to the teacher supply crisis.

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8 NFER survey for STRB, *Teachers’ views on the pay framework in England*

9 NEU, *State of Education survey*, April 2019

Teacher retention – the role of pay and workload

43. Workload was the reason most commonly cited for considering leaving teaching by respondents to the NFER research for the STRB\(^\text{11}\). Pay was identified as the key factor by only 8 per cent of respondents. Clearly workload is a hugely important matter, and we address that issue later in this submission. Nevertheless, pay is also influential in teachers’ decisions to leave the profession, whether in early or later career and in the context of a range of matters including pay levels and pay progression. In an NEU survey (unpublished) conducted in early 2019, 30 per cent of those who said they were considering leaving teaching also said that pay was a factor in their deliberations.

44. DfE research published in September 2017 has underlined this point\(^\text{12}\). When asked for the factors that would attract teachers to work in a particular school, from a choice of 13 factors, 35 per cent of classroom teachers included “salary” in their top three factors and 61 per cent included “salary” in their top five factors. The importance of pay was reflected in responses to the question on what would deter teachers from working in a particular school.

45. Of those respondents to the NFER survey who were considering leaving the profession, a small majority expected their pay to be lower in a new job\(^\text{13}\). It should not be concluded from this, however, that teacher pay issues are not of direct relevance to decisions to leave.

Vacancies and mismatch

46. The STRB is aware of our reservations about the usefulness of data on vacant teaching posts. The information is obtained in November, by which time schools will have in many cases taken action to deal with unfilled posts including measures such as increasing teaching time and directing non-specialist teachers to take classes. Notwithstanding these methodological problems, however, it is instructive to note that the number of vacancies in state-funded schools reached a new post-2010 high in November 2018, and while the number of temporarily filled posts was lower than the previous year, it was almost double the equivalent figure in 2011 and was higher than in any year between 2010 and 2013\(^\text{14}\).

\(^{11}\)NFER survey for STRB, *Teachers’ views on the pay framework in England*
\(^{12}\)DfE, *Analysis of school and teacher level factors relating to teacher supply*, September 2017
\(^{13}\)NFER survey for STRB, *Teachers’ views on the pay framework in England*
47. Teacher shortages across the curriculum are displayed in the latest data on teachers teaching subjects in which they have no post-A Level qualification. In three-quarters of the 32 subject areas for year groups 7-13, a fifth or more of teachers had no relevant post-A Level qualification.\textsuperscript{15}

48. Severe shortages exist in many subjects, not just maths and science. Computing, history, geography, ICT and several languages showed significantly higher proportions of teachers with no relevant post A-Level qualification than in maths. In many subjects, the position in November 2018 was even worse than a year earlier.

**Teacher recruitment – targets missed**

49. Initial teacher training (ITT) recruitment was above target in every year from 2006-07 to 2011-12 but has been below target in every year since\textsuperscript{16}. As with other aspects of the teacher supply crisis, it is no coincidence that this sustained decline in the ability of the profession to recruit has taken place alongside a sustained fall in the real value and competitiveness of teacher pay and in rates of pay progression.

50. The National Audit Office has pointed out\textsuperscript{17} that the DfE model used for teacher recruitment targets “does not aim to resolve pre-existing teacher shortages, including those caused by previously missed recruitment targets”. Nevertheless, the latest Initial Teacher Training (ITT) Census for 2019-20 showed that the Government missed its overall recruitment target for the seventh successive year.\textsuperscript{18}

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\caption{\% of all postgrad ITT new entrants recruited vs target}
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\textsuperscript{15} DfE, *School workforce in England: November 2018*, Table 12
\textsuperscript{16} House of Commons Library, *Teacher recruitment and retention in England*, 16 December 2019
\textsuperscript{17} National Audit Office, *Training New Teachers*, page 9
\textsuperscript{18} DfE, *Initial teacher training: trainee number census 2019 to 2020*, Table 1b
51. Recruitment targets were again missed in most secondary subject areas. Despite a small increase, the proportion of recruits to target in secondary was only 85 per cent. Primary postgraduate recruitment fell below target, from 103 per cent of target in 2018-19 to 98 per cent of target in 2019-20.  

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19 DfE, Initial teacher training: trainee number census 2019 to 2020, Table 1c
52. The graph below shows UCAS monthly statistics for the 2020 cycle.\textsuperscript{20} The number of applications to start initial teacher training in September 2020 shows no improvement on the pattern of applications in the past two years.

![Graph showing total applications to teacher training (UCAS)](image)

53. Another pressure on teacher recruitment is the decline in the graduate-age population. With a projected decrease of 8 per cent in the number of 21-year-olds between 2019 and 2023\textsuperscript{21}, teaching will be competing for a smaller pool of potential recruits.

54. The Government operates a range of incentives to encourage entry to teaching, including bursaries. The DfE’s recruitment and retention strategy and proposed Early Career Framework also aim to improve teacher recruitment. We are engaging positively with the DfE on these initiatives, but they cannot solve the recruitment problem themselves. We are not recruiting enough teachers even in the subject areas for which significant bursaries are on offer.

55. The range of support being offered has grown ever more complex, when we need clear action and signals to tackle teacher recruitment. Our view, as set out in detail in this evidence, is that the solution to teacher recruitment problems must include significant, clear and across-the-board improvements to teacher pay.

\textsuperscript{20} UCAS Teacher Training statistical releases, \textit{Monthly statistics for the 2020 cycle}

\textsuperscript{21} STRB, \textit{29th Report}, para 3.15.
Teachers from Overseas

56. The STRB’s 29th Report noted the “substantial fall in the numbers of teachers being awarded QTS from both within the European Economic Area (EEA) and non-EEA countries” (para 4.20). The uncertainty around the rights of EU teachers appears to have added to this problem - 3,103 people from member states were awarded QTS in 2018-19, down 35 per cent from the figure in 2015/16 prior to the EU referendum22.

57. A 2017 Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) review of teaching jobs on the shortage occupation list23 focused mainly on non-EEA migrants. It found that they tended to be from Canada, the USA, Australia and New Zealand, countries whose qualified teachers are awarded QTS automatically and therefore receive qualified teachers’ pay on appointment. They were more likely to work in London and the South East, where the higher pay makes it easier to meet visa salary requirements.

58. Given the impending restriction on free movement and the Government’s proposal to bring both non-EEA and EEA migrant workers within the ambit of a single points-based immigration system, the NEU believes that applying similar conditions to EEA migrant teachers will result in similar patterns. Only those EEA teachers whose qualifications are automatically recognised will be encouraged to migrate to the UK to teach, and they will do so only in areas like London and the South East where the level of pay ensures they will be able to meet visa salary requirements.

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22 TRA, Teacher Regulation Agency annual report and accounts 2018 to 2019, pp.76-77
23 MAC, Partial review of the Shortage Occupation List: Review of teachers
Teacher and pupil numbers

59. The missed recruitment targets and growing numbers of teachers leaving the profession have come as pupil numbers have increased significantly. The net result is higher class sizes, increased teacher workload and further teacher supply problems.

60. The proportion of teachers in the whole school workforce dropped from 50.1 per cent in 2011 to 47.9 per cent in 2018. FTE teacher numbers increased by 3 per cent over the same period, as the Government has noted in response to concerns about teacher supply, but pupil numbers increased by 8 per cent. Meanwhile, the proportion of teachers holding QTS fell from 96.2 per cent to 95.3 per cent.\(^\text{24}\)

61. Pupil numbers are set to continue rising. Between 2018 and 2025, an increase of 15 per cent in secondary pupil numbers is expected. Much of this increase will happen in the next 3-4 years, adding to the urgent need to recruit and retain more teachers.\(^\text{25}\)

62. The cumulative impact of this failure to match pupil number increases with increases in teacher numbers can be seen in the sharp increases of recent years in pupil teacher ratios. The latest School Workforce Census showed that the total state-funded PTR (qualified) had increased for the sixth year in succession. The small decline in the nursery and primary PTR still meant that the figure was higher than in any year between 2011 and 2018 except 2017. The PTRs for the secondary and special sectors increased significantly.\(^\text{26}\)

\(^{24}\) DfE, *School workforce in England: November 2018*, Table 1

\(^{25}\) DfE, *National pupil projections: July 2018 (2019 update)*, Table 1

\(^{26}\) DfE, *School workforce in England: November 2018*, Table 17a
63. The latest information on class sizes shows the impact of this failure to ensure teacher numbers increase in line with pupil numbers. Secondary class sizes increased for the fourth year in a row. The average secondary class size increased significantly between 2018 and 2019, from 21.2 to 21.7, while the proportion of secondary school classes with between 31 and 35 pupils grew to 8.4 per cent, compared to 5.6 per cent in 2014. The average class size for primary schools was unchanged in 2019 compared to 2018. The average primary school had 282 pupils in 2019 – an increase of 43 since 2009, equating to an additional 1.5 classes per school.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{27} DfE, \textit{Schools, pupils and their characteristics: January 2019}, Tables 1a & 7a
TEACHER PAY LEVELS

Teacher pay levels – the context

64. In its 29th Report, the STRB again expressed concern about the “weakening position of the national pay and allowance framework for teachers in the wider graduate labour market” (para 4.19). It went on to note that “The evidence relating to pay shows teachers at all career stages lagging behind other graduate professions” (para 4.22). Noting the decline in the relative value of teacher pay against other professional occupations and the whole economy, the STRB concluded that “we are clear that the relative decline of teachers’ pay has been a significant contributory factor in the deterioration in the state of teacher recruitment and retention” (para 4.42).

65. Teacher pay has not only declined relative to other occupations and the whole economy; it has also declined significantly against inflation. The 2.75 per cent increase of September 2019 was only just above the RPI figure for September 2019 of 2.4 per cent, so the increase made little impact on the major real terms cuts to teacher pay since 2010. It is likely that many teachers will again not have received the full 2.75 per cent increase, so for those teachers the real terms cut in pay since 2010 is likely to have increased.

Teacher Pay in Real & Comparative Terms

66. The decline in teacher pay levels, against both RPI inflation28 and against average earnings growth, is illustrated in the graph below. The comparator pay level used in the graph is the maximum of the Upper Pay Range (UPR) – the pay level to which all classroom teachers can justifiably aspire – for England outside London and the Fringe Area. A similar pattern applies, however, for comparisons based on all other levels of the pay structure.

67. Teacher pay at the maximum of the UPR would be 17.2 per cent higher if it had increased in line with RPI inflation since 2010. Teacher pay on the Main Pay Range (MPR) would be 14.4 per cent higher at M1 and 13.3 per cent higher at M6.

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28 The NEU continues to regard RPI inflation as the appropriate measure of inflation for assessing the real-terms value of pay, given its wide acceptance and use in pay negotiations across different sectors of the economy.
68. The latest HM Treasury average of RPI inflation forecasts for the fourth quarter of 2020 at the time of writing\(^{29}\) was 2.8 per cent, but with the impact of Brexit still unknown there are significant risks that the outturn for inflation will be significantly worse than current forecasts.

69. The fact that the sharp decline in the value of teacher pay against inflation has taken place at the same time as the development of a serious teacher supply crisis is no coincidence. Pay is not the only factor in decisions to join or leave the profession, but it is a key factor. The real value of teacher pay has been cut across the whole of the teacher career journey. Serving teachers and potential recruits to the profession know that teacher pay levels and pay prospects have been significantly worsened. That is why a strong and clear message that the cuts to teacher pay will be reversed as a matter of urgency, with effective action from Government including full funding, is essential if we are to solve the recruitment and retention problems.

70. Teachers’ take-home pay has also been reduced due to increased employee pension contributions. Between April 2012 and April 2014, these increased from a flat 6.4 per cent to an average 9.6 per cent in a banded system. Teachers on £43,182 and above pay even more than this – between 10.2 per cent and 11.7 per cent. The Treasury has ruled out any future reduction in employee contributions irrespective of the funding position of the Teachers’ Pension Scheme. The removal of contracting-out for occupational pension schemes has further reduced take-home pay by increasing National Insurance contributions.

\(^{29}\) HM Treasury, *Forecasts for the UK economy*, October 2019
“Total reward”

71. The NEU also wishes to comment on the issue of “total reward” which has recently reappeared in debate. We would point out that research has reminded us that there is no consensus on how “total reward” should be measured. Opinions on the subject will tend to include pensions (especially when they are being expressed by those who are seeking to justify restraint on public sector pay) but will tend to avoid, for example, matters of workload and working time.

72. In relation to pensions, research commissioned by the OME\(^\text{30}\) shows that public sector workers are, on average, worse off in the recently introduced CARE pension schemes. The fact that teachers have not been hugely disadvantaged by this is, as the report notes, simply the legacy of their low pay rises over recent years. The CARE schemes were designed to be significantly cheaper than final salary schemes, in part due to the level of indexation for accrued pensions prior to retirement. It is only because pay rises have been so low that this has not yet happened.

73. Total reward implies that pay and pensions are seen as part of a whole remuneration structure. Young teachers, however, are far more likely to opt out of the TPS than older teachers. Opt-out surveys conducted by the Department for Education have shown that the number of opt-outs has increased significantly over recent years (the peak opt-out level being in the 25-29 age group) and that the majority of opt-outs are for personal financial reasons. Young teachers face a high marginal tax rate, with basic rate income tax at 20 per cent, National Insurance at 12 per cent, student loan repayments at 9 per cent and employee pension contributions at either 7.4 or 8.6 per cent for teachers on M1. This is a combined marginal tax rate of almost 50 per cent, and the only item which can be avoided is the pension contribution. Many young teachers are tempted to opt out due to low pay and other pressures – not least the desire to get on the housing ladder. Opting out provides more money now but damages their financial future. It also damages the argument that pensions (which these teachers are not accruing) must be counted as part of a “total reward” package for all teachers, while workload (which affects all) must be discounted.

74. The NFER research commissioned by the STRB\(^\text{31}\) showed that only 30 per cent of respondents agreed that teaching provides benefits which partly compensate for lower pay compared to other professions. Only 22 per cent of respondents agreed that their pay compared well with what they could earn outside of teaching.

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\(^{30}\) OME, *Total Reward and Pensions in the UK by Occupation in the Public and Private Sectors*

\(^{31}\) NFER survey for STRB, *Teachers’ views on the pay framework in England*
Teacher pay in Scotland

75. We have already referred to the national pay agreement in Scotland which is being implemented on a phased basis in 2019 and 2020. While concluded only after a prolonged industrial dispute, it is nevertheless an agreed settlement supported by the local authority employers, the Scottish Government and the teacher trade unions.

76. The agreement comprises a 7 per cent pay increase from April 2019 plus a further 3 per cent backdated to April 2018, and a further 3 per cent increase to be paid from April 2020. The settlement therefore involves a compounded total increase of 13.51 per cent over three years. It also included commitments on tackling workload and supporting professional development for teachers.32

77. Our proposal for an initial increase of 7 per cent in teacher pay in England matches the 7 per cent increase for 2019 in Scotland. We have set out elsewhere the many other reasons why a 7 per cent increase in England is necessary. The STRB should, however, pay due heed to the fact that failing to match the 7 per cent increase in Scotland may have an impact on recruitment and retention in England, especially in those parts closest to Scotland, and will certainly have an impact on morale across the whole of England.

Implications of an increase in teacher starting pay to £30,000 nationally

78. The Secretary of State’s remit letter refers to the Government’s “intention to increase starting salaries to £30,000 nationally by September 2022”. The Secretary of State says that this would help to make teacher starting pay “amongst the most competitive in the graduate labour market”. As we noted earlier, however, he does not set out his views on what this increase would imply for the pay of other teachers – or even for starting pay in the London pay areas.

79. Implementing the proposal would mean a 23 per cent increase in minimum starting pay by September 2022. The problems of teacher recruitment support quick progress towards this goal. However, despite its apparent significance, this is likely in practice to amount to little more than restoration of the real terms cuts in the value of starting pay since 2010. Should inflation between now and 2022 eat significantly into the real terms gain secured, the £30,000 figure should be reviewed upwards.

32 The Scotsman, Scottish teachers accept 13% pay rise after ‘successful campaign’, 27 March 2019
80. As we have said throughout this submission, we are extremely concerned at the worsening position of teacher retention as well as the repeated failure to hit recruitment targets. Improving teacher starting pay must therefore be accompanied by proportionate increases to pay for all teachers. Simply to implement a £30,000 starting pay figure outside London, without commensurate and proportionate increases in pay at all other parts of the pay structure, including in the London pay areas, would fail to address the real terms pay cuts already experienced and the teacher supply problems to which those cuts have contributed. Appropriate differentials should be retained between the various levels of the pay structure and between the various pay areas as part of a package of significant increases in pay across the board.
THE TEACHER PAY STRUCTURE

The Teacher Pay Structure – the Context

81. The NEU has always argued that the pay structure changes of recent years were fundamentally misguided. The evidence increasingly shows that they have caused serious problems and that a reassessment and reversal of these changes is overdue.

82. In its 29th Report, the STRB concluded that the teacher pay framework is central to providing a career pathway and securing recruitment, retention and motivation. The STRB said, rightly, that “It is essential to recruit, retain and motivate a sufficient number of high-quality teachers. The national pay framework for teachers is central to achieving this. This framework must attract graduates and career changers to train to become teachers as well as former teachers to return to the profession. It must support and motivate teachers to remain in the profession and provide a career pathway for some to progress into [leadership and headship]” (para 4.37).

83. The STRB set out a number of objectives: recruiting, retaining and motivating a sufficient number of high-quality teachers; attracting graduates, career changers and former teachers; and provision of a career pathway. It rightly stated that: “The role of the STRB is to position the national pay framework within the graduate and wider labour markets to support the delivery of all these objectives” (STRB, paragraph 4.37).

84. The STRB also noted that “the need to support retention of classroom teachers argues against further reducing pay differentials between starting pay and pay for more experienced teachers” (para 4.34).

85. We agree that a national pay framework provides essential support to these system-wide goals of teacher recruitment, retention, motivation and career progression. Unfortunately, the current pay framework is increasingly unable to do so due to the “reforms” of recent years. A clear career pathway visible to potential and serving teachers has been replaced by inconsistency, unfairness and unpredictability. Pay portability when moving around a system composed of thousands of workplaces has been removed. Certainty around pay scales and progression on those pay scales has been lost.

86. The STRB must reject any further fracturing of the national pay framework. The STRB rejected targeted approaches to the September 2019 pay increase, noting that such an approach was inappropriate in the context of the widespread nature of the teacher supply problems.
87. The latest evidence on teacher supply including data on teacher shortages across the curriculum, set out elsewhere in this document, confirms that the problems extend across the pay structure. The teacher supply problem is a systemic problem. Targeted approaches to it would simply create new problems and would not tackle the fundamental issue of the inability to recruit and retain the number of teachers needed in the face of competition from other professions.

88. The Office for Manpower Economics (OME) sponsored a number of questions on the teacher pay framework for the NFER’s June 2019 Teacher Omnibus Survey. The results underline the dissatisfaction teachers have with the pay structure. A significantly greater proportion of respondents disagreed than agreed with the proposition that the current pay framework supports teachers in progressing their careers.

89. The unfairness and inequalities resulting from the application of the current pay structure have been illustrated at length by the NEU pay and progression surveys conducted in recent years. The late confirmation of this year’s pay changes has led to a necessary delay to this year’s survey. We will send its initial findings to the STRB when they are available later in January 2020. In the meantime, we will where appropriate refer to previous years’ findings in this submission.

90. We are therefore calling on the STRB to recommend immediate reform of the pay structure which will:

a. restore fixed, mandatory pay scales for classroom teachers with incremental progression based on experience rather than performance;

b. remove the “threshold” between the present Main and Upper Pay Ranges;

c. restore pay portability for classroom teachers moving between schools;

d. end the misguided, discredited and increasingly widely-rejected experiment with PRP for teachers; and

e. establish greater consistency and objectivity on pay for school leaders.

33 Source: STRB Secretariat Note
The current remit

91. The previous Secretary of State’s proposal to give the STRB a separate remit on the teacher pay structure has now been superseded by the remit letter of 18 September from the current Secretary of State. This remit letter refers to “additional advice to schools on the performance-related pay progression pathway for classroom teachers including advisory points on the main and upper pay ranges”. It also asks for the STRB’s views on the “role of progression to the upper pay range and the continued case for separate main and upper pay ranges”. Elsewhere, it says that the Secretary of State’s submission will present a case for a “relatively flatter pay progression structure than is currently typical, alongside significantly higher starting and early career salaries”.

92. It is not clear what the Secretary of State means by this reference to a “relatively flatter structure”. We will, of course, respond to the Secretary of State’s own submission in our supplementary submission. If the Secretary of State’s proposed way forward recommends the reforms we believe are needed (including the restoration of fixed pay points, automatic and faster pay progression with no threshold, pay portability and other steps), we will enthusiastically support those proposals. We are, of course, always ready to work with the STRB and the DfE on developing the changes needed to ensure the pay structure fairly rewards teachers and supports teacher supply.

93. The Secretary of State’s proposal for “advisory points on the main and upper pay ranges” is certainly preferable to the current absence of even advisory points, but as we have said already, the NEU is seeking the return of mandatory rather than advisory points.

94. Despite the pressure from the Government to adopt new structures, we know from NEU surveys and other sources that the overwhelming majority of schools continue to use a 6-point scale on the Main Pay Range and a 3-point scale on the Upper Pay Range, with most using the pay scales jointly recommended by the NEU, ASCL, NAHT and Voice. This demonstrates that schools recognise the value of transparency and consistency in pay and consequently reject flexibility. Mandatory points would also demonstrate greater fairness and transparency to teachers, assisting with recruitment and retention. Schools and teachers alike should welcome the restoration of mandatory pay scale points, not just advisory points, and the STRB should recommend that.
95. Should advisory points be implemented instead, they must at least match the value of those jointly recommended by the NEU and other unions or a further pay loss would be suffered by the many teachers paid on those points. Advisory points should also be accompanied by clear duties on employers to avoid any discrimination, either directly or indirectly, in their use. NEU evidence shows the extent of inequality, bias and unlawful discrimination in the application of the current pay structure. We ask the STRB to recommend that much-strengthened statutory guidance, extending the advice set out in the DfE document ‘Implementing Your School’s Approach to Pay: Advice for Maintained Schools and Local Authorities’, is included in the STPCD.

96. In respect of the other references in the remit to reviewing the pay structure, the STRB has of course expressed concerns about the pay structure in several recent reports and said last year that it looked forward to considering the structure as part of a specific remit (STRB 29th Report, para 4.36). Just as the STRB rightly rejected a targeted pay award last year on the basis that it needed to ensure competitiveness in all parts of the pay framework (para 4.35), the STRB should ensure that it now considers the pay structure as a whole, not just in those areas identified in the Secretary of State’s submission. It should review matters such as the adverse impact (and growing unpopularity among employers) of pay progression based on performance; the common practice among schools of retaining pay portability provisions; the growing and linked concerns about TLR payments and inappropriate expectations on UPR teachers; the problems of the current pay structure for school leaders; and the functioning of the current system of London pay areas. Our own views on these issues are set out below.

The problems caused by pay “flexibility” and PRP

97. The Government remains committed to pay “flexibility” and to PRP in particular, even though there is no evidence for the benefits that these ideologically motivated initiatives were supposed to provide. In his remit letter, the Secretary of State simply states this: “It will, of course, remain the case that schools will be responsible for determining increases in individual teachers’ pay on the basis of a school-level assessment of performance”.

98. Our view, consistently expressed to the STRB and grounded in evidence from our members including our annual pay and progression surveys, is that the dismantling of the national pay structure and the imposition of PRP have resulted in severe damage. These changes were not based on the evidence that should be used to inform major structural reform. They are contributing to the problems of teacher supply by making teaching less attractive to serving and potential teachers alike.
99. Pay “flexibility” and the imposition of PRP have resulted in greater unfairness and inconsistency in pay and pay progression. School funding cuts have meant that pay decisions on the annual pay increase, the use of pay scales and the allocation of pay progression to individuals are often taken with reference to budgetary issues for the school, over which teachers of course have no control. Many teachers have, for example, been denied pay progression even after meeting all of their performance management objectives.

100. The removal of “pay portability”, whereby teachers who move post retain the right to be paid at least at the same point on their pay range, was never actually sought by the Government, instead being proposed by the STRB itself. Experience has shown that its removal was unwanted and an error. Many schools and academies continue to recognise the value of pay portability in attracting candidates for vacant posts and therefore include it in their pay policies. The NEU calls once more for its restoration to the mandatory rules of the pay structure.

101. PRP and the excessive accountability regime have also resulted in significant additional workload, for teachers and school leaders. The work associated with excessive observations has been considerable – yet those observations cause recruitment and retention problems, by undermining teachers’ professionalism and autonomy.

102. There is a growing consensus on the harm done by PRP. Some Multi Academy Trusts have removed or are in the process of removing PRP from their pay structures. We understand that both ASCL and NAHT will declare their formal opposition to PRP in their evidence to the STRB34, joining the long-standing opposition to this system which we have expressed.

103. A transparent national pay structure will help address our concerns about equalities. Mandatory pay scales reduce the possibility of conscious or unconscious bias in pay decisions. Discretionary pay arrangements, on the other hand, open the door to bias. Pay portability protects women teachers against discriminatory pay outcomes when they take career breaks for family reasons.

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34 TES, [Heads turn away from teacher performance pay](https://www.tes.com/article/heads-turn-away-from-teacher-performance-pay), 15 November 2019
104. Inequalities and bias in decisions on teachers’ pay have been consistently uncovered by the NEU’s pay and progression surveys. The following are key findings from the survey conducted during December 2018 and January 2019:

   a. Despite DfE guidance on the “no surprises” principle, most teachers denied pay progression said no performance issues were raised or support given to address them during the year.
   b. Of those teachers denied pay progression, 19 per cent were told explicitly that the decision was due to funding issues, which is of course fundamentally unfair.
   c. Younger teachers aged 35 and under were significantly more likely to receive pay progression than older eligible teachers.
   d. Some 19 per cent of respondents who were absent due to maternity/pregnancy were denied pay progression – with half of these respondents told explicitly that pregnancy or maternity was the reason for the decision.
   e. Compared to 11 per cent of respondents overall, 20 per cent of those defining themselves as disabled and 32 per cent of those who had been absent for at least a month due to disability were denied progression.
   f. Pay progression rates were markedly lower for those working part-time or other flexible working arrangements.
   g. Pay progression rates were significantly lower for Asian/Asian British and Black/Black British teachers than for White British/European teachers.
   h. Teachers were significantly less likely to receive the cost-of-living increase if they were female, disabled, non-White British or worked part-time.

105. It is clear from these findings that DfE equality advice is being disregarded, including blatantly unlawful discrimination on grounds on pregnancy and maternity.

106. In general terms, this reinforces the need for a much stronger approach on structural bias, prejudiced assumptions and inequalities. Instead, the failure of the Government to conduct an equality impact assessment has been compounded by a failure to even properly monitor the operation of the pay system. The STRB should, for example, consider recommending mandatory pay progression for women who are absent due to maternity or pregnancy and for teachers absent for reasons related to disability.

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35 NEU, Teachers’ Pay and Progression for September 2018, January 2019
107. We have repeatedly called on the DfE to collect and publish clear and comprehensive information on pay progression. The NEU surveys secure very large responses, with 34,000 teachers responding to the survey in late 2018. The DfE, however, is in a position to collect, analyse and report on pay progression decisions taken by employers, including analysis by every equality characteristic. This is not “micro-management” – monitoring data provided by local decision-makers is essential to inform any assessment of the impact of the current pay arrangements.

108. Government policy has not facilitated the elimination of structural discrimination in the teacher pay structure. In the exercise of their functions, Government departments are required under Part 11 of the Equality Act 2010 to have due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation and any other unlawful conduct in the Equality Act 2010, to advance equality of opportunity and to foster good relations. The Government must take steps to remove or minimise disadvantages suffered by people with protected characteristics due to having that characteristic. It must assess the impact on equality of its policies and practices before decisions are made. The Government has a duty to assess the equality impact of its proposals on teacher pay structures.

109. The recent Government Equalities Office (GEO) report, *Women’s Progression in the Workplace*[^36], concludes that one of the main barriers to women’s progression comes from “organisational norms and processes that allow gender bias to creep into decision making”. The report illustrates how processes for progression open up space for bias, noting that “In the absence of clear systems and transparent systems, decisions about pay and promotion are more likely to be made through processes that disadvantage women, including via networks and the process of social cloning, where those in positions of power champion those who are like themselves.”

110. The School Workforce data shows clearly that women in teaching are disadvantaged in terms of career progression. The mean average pay gap for women teachers aged 40-44 in LA maintained primary and nursery schools is 13 per cent. It is almost 15 per cent for women teachers aged 45-49 in primary academies[^37]. The pay gap is 15 per cent for women leaders over 60 in state funded special, PRU and AP schools[^38]. The pay gap for women head teachers in all state funded schools rises from 9 per cent for those under 40 to 17 per cent for those aged 60 or over[^39].

[^36]: Government Equalities Office, *Gender equality at work: research on the barriers to women’s progression*
[^37]: DfE, *School workforce in England: November 2018*, Table 9a
[^38]: DfE, *School workforce in England: November 2018*, Table 9c
[^39]: DfE, *School workforce in England: November 2018*, Table 9d
111. The report published by the Government in August 2019 on the gender pay gap in the public sector\footnote{OME, \textit{Understanding the Gender Pay Gap within the UK Public Sector}} also raised concerns about the gender pay gap in the public sector, even though that gap is narrower in the public than in the private sector. The report also found that the presence of PRP increased the likelihood of gender pay gaps, with women less likely to receive PRP.

112. The GEO report says this: "In many workplaces persistent norms of overwork, expectations of constant availability and excess workloads conflict with unpaid caring responsibilities – the majority of which still fall on women." This sentence sums up our members’ experience of the appraisal arrangements for teachers. The introduction of performance related pay has exacerbated overwork, presenteeism, and excessive workload; and has all but eliminated any semblance of work-life balance for teachers.

113. The latest information from the School Workforce Census shows women constitute 75.6 per cent of the teaching profession in state-funded schools in England\footnote{DfE, \textit{School workforce in England: November 2018}, Table 5}. This high proportion of women in the profession has not changed significantly in recent years. For the nursery and primary sector, this figure was 85.8 per cent. We need to eliminate bias in pay decisions but we must also ensure that the teaching profession is equally attractive to men and women. Cutting the real value of teacher pay has not helped to achieve this.

114. The GEO report focused on gender bias. The findings can be applied equally to bias against Black teachers and disabled teachers. The Government cannot continue with performance related pay, advisory pay awards and the new proposals without undertaking a comprehensive equality impact assessment.

115. The STRB said in 2018 that the DfE should conduct further research focusing on the equality implications of the teacher pay system. In its 29\textsuperscript{th} Report, the STRB restated that the DfE should conduct this further research. We call on the STRB to make a specific recommendation on this key issue.
Teaching and Learning Responsibility (TLR) payments

116. As we note above, the pay structure must reflect the importance and ensure the provision of appropriate payment for additional responsibility. This is an under-appreciated factor in discussion on teacher retention generally and recruitment to promoted posts in particular. The importance of TLR payments in supporting teacher career progression and the supply of senior teachers and school leaders must be accommodated in the pay structure.

117. The NFER research commissioned by the STRB\(^{42}\) showed only 30 per cent of respondents agreeing that additional responsibilities were fairly rewarded in their schools. This response is no surprise when we consider the fact that, like other elements of teacher pay, the value of TLRs in real terms against inflation has fallen significantly and in primary schools in particular they are still not paid in sufficient number.

118. It is significant that, while the proportion of teachers receiving TLRs did increase between 2010 and 2017 according to DfE evidence submitted to the STRB in the previous round, the real terms value of TLRs in payment fell. Clearly many schools still understand the value of additional payments for sustained responsibilities, and we expect that investigation would show that many are increasingly using them for recruitment or retention purposes, but the value of these payments generally is something else which has been hit by the cuts to school funding.

119. In academies, TLRs are significantly less likely to be paid and their value has declined even more significantly in academies than in maintained schools. There is no justification for this, and this factor underlines our concern about the impact on teacher pay of increasing “pay flexibility”.

120. Access to responsibility payments is a particularly severe problem in nursery, primary and special schools. Fewer than one in five teachers in nursery and primary schools and fewer than one in four teachers in special schools receive TLR payments. Teachers in primary schools – whether on the Main or Upper Pay Range - are commonly expected to take on responsibility for a subject area (or, often, subject areas) without additional payment. This has never been either fair or consistent with the TLR payment structure.

\(^{42}\) “NFER survey for STRB, Teachers’ views on the pay framework in England”
121. The advent of the new Ofsted inspection framework has brought this issue to the fore. It assumes a management structure whereby teachers hold responsibility for a subject area that is supported by means of additional non-contact time and rewarded by means of an appropriate TLR. That structure is not, however, in place in all secondary schools and is even more of a rarity in primary schools. The new Ofsted framework is now causing an outcry among primary teachers, who are being held personally accountable during inspections for subject achievement throughout the school and for other teachers’ delivery, despite receiving neither payment nor (even more damagingly) any additional non-contact time for their “responsibility”.

122. The NFER research showed\textsuperscript{43} that less than a fifth of classroom teacher respondents working in primary schools agreed that additional responsibilities were fairly rewarded. The new Ofsted framework has increased concerns among primary teachers substantially. The whole TLR system needs review, but particularly so in primary schools.

**Upper Pay Range (UPR) issues**

123. We have said earlier in this submission that the NEU supports the restoration of a single pay spine for classroom teachers, in place of the Main and Upper Pay Ranges and the “threshold” process for movement from one to the other.

124. We know from feedback from members and from the findings of the NFER research that teachers on the UPR are often expected to undertake additional responsibilities without additional payment, on the basis that this is in some way a requirement of their UPR status. Teachers rightly reject this. Paragraph 48 of the School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Document (STPCD) states that teachers cannot “be expected to take on the responsibility of, and accountability for, a subject area or to manage other teachers without appropriate additional payment”. We know from members that this provision of the STPCD is often ignored.

125. Teachers who have reached the UPR have had to overcome significant hurdles and demonstrate significant professional achievements to satisfy often unreasonable progression requirements. UPR pay represents the rate for the job of an experienced teacher – even though, as we say elsewhere, that rate is far too low. Payment for sustained additional responsibilities is entirely distinct from the pay rate for teachers on the UPR and the two must not be conflated.

\textsuperscript{43} NFER survey for STRB, *Teachers’ views on the pay framework in England*
126. Teachers remember that the original purpose of the UPR (or Upper Pay Scale as it then was) was to reward classroom teaching without teachers having to take on additional responsibilities. Teachers have already seen the original Upper Pay Scale reduced from 5 points to 3 points, followed by the removal of mandatory pay scale points and of portability of pay entitlements between schools. The increasing tendency to impose additional responsibilities on UPR teachers without appropriate payment is a key factor in teacher retention problems and must be addressed.

127. The issue of additional responsibilities for teachers on the UPR was included in the NFER research commissioned by the STRB. In response to a question on whether teachers on the UPR should receive payments for additional responsibilities, two-thirds of all respondents including classroom teachers and school leaders said that UPR teachers should receive such payments.

**SEN Allowances**

128. This area has previously been the subject of considerable review in pursuit of a robust system which properly rewards those with additional teaching involvement, expertise and qualifications in relation to teaching students with SEND. The NEU does not consider that the current system has things right. The period since the last review has seen a further move towards inclusivity in mainstream education. The current SEN allowances structure means that those with a specific teaching responsibility for a small number of students with SEND are far more likely to secure additional payment than those who teach a larger number of students with SEND within a mainstream class setting.

129. As with additional teaching and learning responsibilities (above), we should not allow a situation to develop where carrying out additional responsibilities without additional payment is normalised in this way. The NEU would therefore favour a further review of this system in order to ensure that teachers who do carry additional responsibilities in this area are properly and fairly rewarded.

**Leadership pay issues**

130. Pay and pay progression are also key issues for teachers who are school leaders, intensifying the recruitment and retention difficulties for that group as well. We do not believe that the current pay arrangements provide the consistency or objectivity required. Already subject to the enormous pressure of the high stakes accountability system, school leaders must also cope with the bureaucracy, workload and conflict with staff prompted by PRP in teaching. They should be entitled to be fairly paid, yet the current system allows some to receive unjustifiable increases in pay while many more are denied any pay increases year after year.
131. The focus of media attention is often on unjustifiably high pay for individual school leaders and “executive heads” leading a group of schools. Pay rates for individual leaders must not become detached from the circumstances of the school or the pay of other teachers in the school. The current system allows some to receive unjustifiable increases in pay. This is a longstanding problem which must be resolved. The position of executive head posts must also be brought within a coherent structure.

132. The problem for most leaders, however, is the same as that for their classroom teacher colleagues. The system is not delivering fair pay which maintains its value, remains competitive with counterparts elsewhere and rewards their efforts through fair access to progression. While some leaders benefit inappropriately, many more are denied appropriate pay increases year after year. With funding problems leading to cuts to many schools’ leadership groups, the opportunities for classroom teachers to progress to leadership are being restricted at the same time as the workload and risks involved deter that aspiration.

Pay in the London area

133. With teacher supply problems affecting the whole of England, the NEU continues to believe that a move to regional pay would create far more problems than it would provide solutions. We are, however, concerned about the current London pay area arrangements and their influence on the teacher shortages affecting some parts of the London area.

134. The Secretary of State’s remit letter suggests no aspiration to review this part of the pay structure. We believe that a separate review of the operation of the current London pay system and the London teacher labour market is nevertheless needed. This should include a review based on a cost compensation approach which considers whether the current geographical pay areas adequately reflect the additional costs of living and working on the various parts of those areas. It should also include consideration of the case for a London wide allowance for teachers.

135. As we and other unions have noted previously, non-pay issues are sometimes as relevant as pay to the STRB’s remit to recommend measures which will help secure teacher supply. We would welcome the STRB expressing its support for the argument that the Government needs to take further measures to increase the supply of housing available to teachers as key workers.
TEACHER WORKLOAD

136. Teacher workload remains unsustainable, despite the increased attention being paid by the DfE to this issue. Numerous surveys and analysis by the DfE, NEU and other stakeholders continue to demonstrate this. The workload challenge must continue to be addressed as a matter of urgency.

137. The NEU believes that the STRB has a role to play in the debate on how to reduce teacher workload. We therefore call again on the STRB to seek a remit to review matters relating to workload, in particular the STPCD’s provisions on working time and work/life balance and on professional obligations impacting on workload.

138. Workload continues to be consistently cited as one of the principal drivers for decisions by teachers to leave the profession. In studies seeking a more detailed breakdown of reasons for these decisions, teachers report a predictable range of matters such as ‘work out of school hours’, ‘pressures of accountability’ and ‘increased paperwork’ as main reasons for leaving.

139. This is confirmed by the DfE’s Teacher Workload Surveys (TWS) for 2016 and 2019 which surveyed in-service teachers in England about their working time and workload. Both surveys found that teachers generally felt they spent too much time on admin tasks, lesson planning, marking and data management, rather than on teaching. The breakdown of responses by phase suggests that workload is an even greater issue, and therefore likely to be an even greater driver for quitting teaching, among primary than among secondary school teachers.

140. Although the 2019 TWS shows an apparent reduction since 2016 in working time, which the DfE links to its attempts to help schools address various key drivers of workload (data collection, marking, administrative tasks, and planning and preparation), teachers are still working unreasonably long hours. The survey suggests that 94 per cent of full-time teachers and middle leaders are still working more than 40 hours a week, while 57 per cent are working more than 50 hours a week. Furthermore, around two-thirds of full-time teachers are working longer than the 48-hour weekly maximum stipulated by the Working Time Regulations.

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44 DfE, *Factors affecting teacher retention: qualitative investigation*, March 2018
45 DfE, *Teacher Workload Survey 2016*
46 DfE, *Teacher Workload Survey 2019*
141. Perceptions of the impact on work-life balance are still extremely negative in the 2019 TWS. The proportion of teachers viewing workload as a fairly/very serious problem has reduced slightly, but 73 per cent of primary teachers and 87 per cent of secondary teachers who responded to the survey said workload is a serious problem.

142. 91 per cent of primary and 94 per cent of secondary teachers reported that they could not complete assigned workload during contracted working hours; 65 per cent of primary and 79 per cent of secondary teachers stated their workload was unacceptable; and only 31 per cent of primary and 26 per cent of secondary school teachers agreed that they achieved a good balance between work life and private life. These figures may again be a slight improvement from the 2016 TWS but are still unacceptable.

143. The 2019 TWS has also demonstrated the increasing level of time spent by primary and secondary senior leaders on processes of individual pay determination. This helps explain the increasing groundswell of opinion against PRP, with several significant multi-academy trusts now removing PRP or considering doing so. We have already asked the STRB to review and recommend ending PRP in teaching.

144. Another report from NFER\textsuperscript{47} published in October 2018, \textit{Teacher Workforce Dynamics in England - Nurturing, Supporting and Valuing Teachers}, shows that teachers have considerably lower satisfaction with their amount of leisure time compared to, for example, nurses and police officers. The nature of the school year means that teachers’ working pattern is very intense during working weeks, creating greater pressure and negative impact on health and well-being. Teachers who cannot cope with these demands may well, of course, end up leaving the profession.

145. The NEU has welcomed the recommendations of the 2018 Workload Advisory Group (WAG)\textsuperscript{48}, which have the DfE’s full support\textsuperscript{49}, and the redesigned DfE workload toolkit and associated initiatives. But the steps taken so far to reduce workload through reducing the burdens of non-teaching activity have not had the necessary impact. The NEU has continued to argue that the main driver of workload is the current high stakes accountability system driven by Ofsted and a new inspection framework which increases, rather than reduces, the pressures on subject leaders among others. The NEU has also said that the DfE toolkit lacks teeth and lacks any directive content among its exhortations to review working practices. Clearly more needs to be done.

\textsuperscript{47} NFER, \textit{Teacher Workforce Dynamics in England}, October 2018

\textsuperscript{48} Teacher Workload Advisory Group, \textit{Making data work}

\textsuperscript{49} Government response to the Workload Advisory Group report ‘Making Data Work’
146. Teachers are working far in excess of their 1265 hours of directed time - on average, approximately an extra 20 hours a week. Contractual working time must be part of the discussion on means of addressing the workload crisis. The NEU believes that a review of teachers’ contractual working time and professional duties, and a review of the cases for reinstating statutory guidance on these areas, will assist the aim of reducing workload to more manageable levels.

147. Regarding the current STPCD provisions, we have long been particularly concerned about the overarching requirement on teachers to “work such additional hours as may be necessary to enable the effective discharge of the teacher’s professional duties” (STPCD para 51.7). As long as this requirement to work unlimited hours remains in place, attempts to address the current workload problems will be undermined, as employers will never be obliged to ensure that working time is reduced to any specific level. In our view, the current provisions on working time should be reviewed and this open-ended requirement removed. Similarly, the current provisions on professional duties should be reviewed and consideration given to restoring, for example, statutory guidance on matters such as administrative tasks which teachers should not undertake.

148. Achieving a cultural shift on workload is clearly proving to be a challenge for many schools which have become entrenched in their way of doing things and their attitude to workload. Recommendations to review working practices are not having the necessary impact on workload. They must be bolstered by measures which set limits on the additional hours which teachers are expected to work. This would help ensure the implementation of different working practices and more effective deployment of teachers and support staff.

149. Most teachers regard their concerns about workload, hours and job satisfaction as more significant than their concerns about pay. If the STRB is serious about playing its part in addressing the crisis in teacher supply, it cannot ignore the issue of workload.